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U.S. FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, INO JIMA CAMPAIGN.


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1. REPORT DATE 1946		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVE	RED
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE				5a. CONTRACT	NUMBER
IWO JIMA Campaign				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
	ZATION NAME(S) AND AE Amphibious Corps, (` /	e, San	8. PERFORMING REPORT NUMB	G ORGANIZATION ER
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				11. SPONSOR/M NUMBER(S)	ONITOR'S REPORT
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIL Approved for publ	LABILITY STATEMENT lic release, distributi	on unlimited			
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO JFSC - WW II Dec					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER	19a. NAME OF
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified	SAR	OF PAGES 185	RESPONSIBLE PERSON

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THIB CORPS LANDING FORCE

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


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IWOJIMA



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CAMPAIGN

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO.

U.S. Fleet marine Force, Paralin

20 May 1945.

UNCLASSIFIE

From: To

The Commanding General.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Via:

(1) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops.

(2) Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.

(3) Commander Fifth Fleet.

(4) Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subject:

Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

cot. 17

Enclosure:

(A) Commanding General Special Action Report INO JIMA Campaign and Annexes thereto.

Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

SECRET and TOP SECRET material included in this report are hereby reduced to CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy to:

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CG, 2d Marine Division CG, 3d Marine Division

CG. 4th Marine Division

CG, 5th Marine Division

CG. 6th Marine Division

Commander Amphibious Forces Pacific

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HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS. C/O FLEET POST OFFICE. SAN FRANCISCO.

13 May 1945.

From:

The Commanding General.

To:

The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Via:

(1) The Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops.

(2) Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.

(3) Commander Fifth Fleet.

(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas.

Subject:

Special Action Report, IWO JIMA Campaign.

Enclosure:

(A) Special Situation Map of IWO JIMA.

ļ. V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE

a. PLANNING

Information was received early in October, 1944, that the V Amphibious Corps with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions in assault would be employed as the landing force for the capture and occupation of IWO JIMA, VCLCANO ISLANDS. The Corps Headquarters was then at Guam but proceeded to Pearl Harbor, arriving in the middle of of October. At this time the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, plus a number of miscellaneous units and garrison elements required in the assault phase, were placed under Corps control for planning, training, and operations. The 3d Merine Division was to be in expeditionary troops reserve.

The establishment of the Corps Headquarters at Pearl in the same vicinity with the Expeditionary Troops Commander, the Attack Force Commander, and higher echelons facilitated the overall planning and the adjustment of problems of interest to more than one agency. The separation of the Divisions and the bulk of the Corps elements from the Corps Headquarters obviously hampered the development of the Corps into a homogeneous combat team. This was overcome to the greatest extent practicable by frequent visits of the Commanding General and Staff to the Divisions and by visits of unit Commanders and staff officers to the Corps Headquarters.

TRAINING

In view of the separation of units noted above, it was necessary to delegate training of ground units largely to the subordinate commanders, although one Command Post Exercise was conducted with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, covering the coordination of control of air, artillery, and naval gunfire. Vessels were made available on request of subordinate units for various types of amphibious training and the Corps assisted insofar as practicable in training the new TRANSDIVS in the conduct of ship-to-shore movement.

The original target date for the operation would have necessitated beginning embarkation of units about 1 December. Full replacements had not been furnished for all units until about 1 November, therefore it was fortunate from the standpoint of the

Landing Force that the target date was eventually postponed approximately one month which permitted the assimilation of replacements in the combat teams. The battle replacements were received very late and there was insufficient opportunity to train them in their shore party duties and to prepare them for use as replacements in the Divisions when required at the objective. In general, however, troopwere in a satisfactory state of training when embarked.

Rehearsals were held in the Hawaiian Area from 11 to 18 January and were well executed. The absence of the naval gunfire ships and the air support units on other operations made it impracticable for them to participate in this rehearsal. This was overcome to some extent by a short rehearsal in the forward area. Another element that detracted from the usefulness of the first rehearsal was the absence in the forward area of certain of the amphibian tractor units that were to participate in the assault. These units, including two battalions of cargo tractors and one armored amphibian battalion, received two days training with the units to which they were attached in the forward area rehearsal.

c. ORGAMIZATION

The organization for the operation was generally very satisfactory. There were adequate engineering units available to carry on the base development plan as rapidly as the tactical situation permitted, and there was little, if any, lost time at the objective in the execution of base development in spite of enemy actic

Personnel available for initial shore party functions used far in excess of any previously furnished due to the provision of a field depot of some 1,500 personnel and the 5,000 battale replacements available to the two assault Divisions, with an additional 2,300 available when elements of the 3d Marine Division landed. There were on D-Day in excess of 10,000 men available for shore party. As the battle progressed and casualties were sustained, the battle replacements were gradually transferred from shore party duty to the combat units. This was done without any important loss of efficiency of the shore party, although the arrival of garrison echolons, the unfavorable beach conditions, and the necessity for alternating between eastern and western beaches for unloading created a strain on available facilities and personnel at times.

The ground scholons of the initial air units to be employed were carried in assault shipping. These were generally adequate for their mission. Some delay, however, was occasioned by

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the necessity for using every available cubic foot of space in shipping assigned to Corps and the desirability of dispersing such element throughout available shipping in order that the loss of one ship would not have completely eliminated any essential element or service at the objective.

d. TACTICS AND OPERATIONS.

There were only two beach areas available on INO JIMA sufficient to permit the landing on a two-Division front. In view of the provailing wind, the Preferred Plan called for landing on the southeastern beaches with an Alternate Plan for landing on the western beaches directly opposite. Only minor changes in the general scheme of menouver were necessary to fit either plan. The landing was actually executed on the preferred beaches as planned and on schedule. As expected, heavy opposition developed immediately from the high ground on both flanks and the only substantial gain initially was direct to the front. The 4th Marine Division on the right reached the edge of Airfield No. 1, and the 5th Marine Division on the left captured a portion of the southern and of Airfield Mo. 1 and reached the high ground overlooking the west coast on D-Day. At nightfall gains of from 500 to 800 yards had been made with one regiment facing Mt. Suribachi to the south and the remainder of the force facing north and northwest, generally around Airfield No. 1. The assault clements of both Divisions, including reserve regiments, were landed by nightfall, plus a portion of the artillery and other supporting arms, making a total of some 30,000 men ashore that day.

The original plan based on estimates of enemy strength had provided for the 3d Marine Division to remain in floating reserve. In accordance with this plan, one regiment of the 5th Marine Division (RCT 26) had been held out for Corps Reserve. As additional information was received during the planning period indicating a continuously higher estimate of enemy strength and a large increase in the number of defensive installations, combined with a reduction in the planned naval gunfire support available, request was made on reaching the forward area to have one regiment of the 3d Marine Division (CT 21 available at the target on the morning of D-Day. This was approved and the regiment of the 5th Marine Division previously withheld in Corps Reserve was released to that Division.

on D/1 the attack was continued both to the north, and to the south against Mt. Suribachi, against heavy opposition. The beaches were continuously under fire from both flanks which hampered unloading, caused many casualties, and the loss of equipment,

ammunition, and supplies. As it was imporative to push the attack and secure sufficient room to land supplies unobstructed and to expedite the initiation of airfield construction, the release of the 3d Marine Division, less one regiment, was requested. CT 21 of that Division had been landed on D plus 2 and attached temporarily to the 4th Marine Division. Two days later the 3d Marine Division, less RCT 3, began landing and took over the central zone of the front. By this time Mt. Suribachi had been captured which permitted the more or less unobstructed use of the southern beaches, cleared the southern end of the island for the landing of Corps and garrison elements, and permitted the release of part of the regiment that had been employed there for use elsewhere.

Thereafter a slow but steady advance was made up the island against determined resistance until on D plus 8 elements of the 3d Marine Division reached the northeast coast, splitting the onemy into two isolated groups. The northern tip of the island at KITAMO POINT was reached on 16 March and as only one isolated pocket romained at that time the island was declared secured as of that date. Resistance in lesser degree continued for another ten days from this pocket and from groups that had been concealed in the thousands of caves and emerged each night to harass our units. The 4th Marine Division completed evacuation on 19 March and the 5th Marine Division on 27 March. In the meantime the 147th Infantry, the garrison regiment, had arrived, on 21 March and that regiment with the two regiments and miscellaneous units of the 3d Marine Division were passed to the control of the Island Commander together with responsibility for the defense of the island at 0800 on 26 March. Remaining units of the 5d Marine Division and Corps Service elements were withdrawn gradually as the situation permitted, the last regiment being evacuated late in April, 1945.

The cooperation of the Garrison Force was excellent throughout and the transfer of control was effected smoothly.

Our battle casualties were some 30 per cent of the entire Landing Force. In the infantry regiments, however, these casualties amounted to an average of 75 per cent in the two assault divisions and 60 per cent in the 3d Marine Division, of the original regimental strength. Furthermore, the loss in key personnel, particularly leaders, was even higher. Seven thousand five hundred (7500) pattle replacements were provided, but this personnel was received too late to permit adequate training and integration into the combat units. As most of the infantry combat units involved were in centact with the enemy for total periods in excess of three weeks, the combat efficiency towards the close of the operation was very low.



e. EMEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT.

The enemy conducted an intelligent, passive defense from successive highly organized positions. As sufficient forces had been landed on D-Day to insure retention of a beachhead, the enemy did not attempt a major counterattack to eject our forces from the island but rather remained in position and fought to the bitter end.


The bost estimate of enemy strength on the island derived from identification of units and interrogation of prisoners of war was from 21,000 to 22,000. The reports of enemy killed by subordinate units together with those reported killed or captured since completion of the occupation total over 30,000. It therefore appears that troop units reported more enemy killed from day to day than was actually the case; also that the overestimates were more or less evenly distributed throughout the three divisions. As the enemy removes his dead whenever practicable and as it is normally impossible to determine the numbers of enemy scaled in the innumerable caves, it is almost impossible to secure an accurate count of enemy dead based on troop reports.

It was found on landing that some 5,000 enemy naval troops had not been counted in any preliminary estimates of enemy strength. This underestimation of enemy strength has been true in every operation in which this Corps has participated.

f. SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS

Supply and equipment were generally adequate. The stubbornness of enemy resistance from blockhouses, pillboxes, and caves necessitated a heavy expenditure of artillery ammunition which, combined with considerable losses in ammunition dumps and on the beach by enemy fire, resulted in a continuing shortage. This was met in part by bringing up resupply ships and by restrictions on the amounts to be expended by subordinate units. The difficulties in unloading ammunition from cargo vessels indicates the desirability of embarking resupply ammunition in LSTs, which permits rapid unloading either directly on the beach or by amphibious vehicles. In fact throughout operations of this Corps the LST has been the best vessel available for both troops and supplies.

The ship-to-shore movement for the actual assault was executed with precision. It soon developed, however, that small craft up to LCMs could not use the beaches, and consequently reliance had to be placed on LCTs, LSMs, and LSTs, plus LVTs and DUKWs.



As there was an inadequate number to meet all requests, it was necessary to allot such equipment by a central control. The unloading of equipment and supplies could be executed much more efficiently and with loss confusion and lost time if adequate craft are available to permit each division or other separate unit to deal directly with the TRAYSROW Commander concerned.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in landing reserves because of the facts outlined in the proceding paragraph and because the sea was usually rough in the transport area. It is believed this can be simplified in the future by utilizing LSTs to so directly alongside transports after they have debarked assault troops and transfer reserve elements to the LSTs directly. If enemy resistance is light and beach conditions are favorable, reserved can be landed directly on the beach from LSTs. If this is not the case, the LSTs can then return to the launching area and reembark the tractors for landing these reserves.

SPECIAL FEATURES.

Detailed comments and recommendations on various special features of the operation are contained in the various annexes and appendices to this report. Only these considered to be of particular importance are mentioned here. Comments relating to reports of subordinate units are covered by endorsement on those report.

NAVAL GUNFIRE

The naval gunfire on D-Day and thereafter was highly offective. The preliminary bombardment did not meet expectations because of the shortage of naval gunfire support ships and because of lost time in the preliminary bombardment due to bad weather and the interference of mine sweeping activities and UDT operations, which forced longer range fire or a diversion of available naval gunfire in support of these special operations.

AIR.

Air bombardment prior to D-Day, although continued over a long period of time, did not appear to have caused much damage. The air support on D-Day and for the two or three days following was highly effecteve, and the best that this Corps has received in any operation to date. Subsequent thereto the departure of the heavy earriers reduced the availability of aircraft for support of the

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ground troops to a point below that considered essential. Although land-based air was used to a certain extent after its establishment on Iwo Jima and was very effective when used, the areas open to aircreft bombing and strafing at that time were so limited as to prevent the realization of the full effectiveness of this support.

There has been a reluctance by aviation to use heavy bombs both in the preliminary and in support missions after the troop land. The destructiveness of such bombs against the type of installations found and their ability to strip camouflage and uncover enemy installations is so important as to warrant serious consideration of the use of the heaviest bombs procurable in any future attacks on well-defended positions. It is also considered that night air patrols over the objective are highly important in spite of their possible interference with identification of enemy aircraft attempting to attack.

The Landing Force Support Air Centrol Unit, when established ashore, proved very effective. Effective support was hampered initially to some extent by the fact that Maval Gunfire Control and Air Support Centrol were not in the same vessel with the Attack and Landing Force Commanders.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS.

The maps used in this operation were propared from cerial photographs taken several months prior to the operation and were inaccurate with respect to elevations and in many cases with respect to the types of roads indicated. These inaccuracies led to continual erroneous reporting of troop positions which, in turn, interfered with the effectiveness of naval gunfire, air, and artillery support. In order to obviate this difficulty in the future, it is recommended that successive editions of the basic maps be issued showing the latest information, in an effort to have the vertical control sufficiently accurate to permit proper reporting of front line positions and target designations.

Acrial photography should be continuous throughout the operation and particularly after important strikes by air or naval benbardment. These strikes uncover enemy installations and permit more effective subsequent attacks. Also, repeated aerial photography and interpretation will permit engaging deep support targets by naval gunfire, air, and heavy artillery and their destruction before the troops reach positions so close as to prevent this type of support.

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TANKS.

Tanks proved indispensable in this operation, particularly the flame-thrower and bulldozer tanks, which were required for the assault of close-in fortified positions. An increase in these special types of tanks has been requested. Also, tanks should be of the heaviest type available which can be lifted and which can negotiate the terrain to be expected at the objective.

AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS AND DUKWIS.

Amphibian tractors and DUKW's again proved their special adaptability to this type of warfare.

CONCLUSION.

This operation was conducted against a heavily fortified position in which there was little choice as to where to land.

It was not practicable to go around. The cost of the operation was heavy, but the present use of this base indicates that it was worth the cost. Some reduction in the number of casualties might have been effected by a more deliberate conduct of the attach and increased preparations prior to the day-to-day assaults, but time was considered to be an important factor. Other operations were pending, which required the utilization of elements released from this operation. Also, the position was emposed and there was a constant hazard of strong enemy air attacks on shipping and shore facilities at the target. These factors all indicated the necessity for rapid completion of the occupation.

The personnel of all echelons of the Corps conducted themselves in keeping with the highest traditions of the Military and Maval Service. It was a high privilege to command these troops.

H. SCHILDT.

ANNEXES: ABLE - VACLE Operation Plan No. 3-44 and 4-44 and Operation Orders 1-45 to 32-45 inclusive.

BAKER - General Staff Section Reports.

CHARLIE - Special Staff Section Reports.


DOG - Report by Commanding Officer Corps Troops.

EASY - Division Reports.

FOX - Landing Force Air Support Control Unit Report.

GEORGE - IsCom IVO JIMA Preliminary Report.

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US CORPS LANDING FORCE

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- IWO JIMA-

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Operation Plan No 3-44 & 4-44

and

Operation Orders Nos 1-45 to 32-45 Inclusive

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Annex ABLE
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Operation Plan 3-44, 4-44, and Operation Orders 1-45 to 32-45 inclusive

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Operation Plans 3-44 and 4-44 are omitted in cases where addressees have received them previously

Annex ABLE to Special Action Report IWO JIMA Campaign.

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field

20 February 1945.

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OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of DEURET dispatch.

NUMBER. . .1-45)

- a. A counterattack in force is anticipated anytime after darkness tonight. There is an indication that the enemy has conserved its forces and can support a strong counterattack with tanks and artillery.
 - b. Naval gunfire support for the preparation will be as assigned to the divisions. Submit requests to this Headquarters for naval gunfire preparation desired above that assigned for direct support. A 72 plane strike group will be on station at 0730 to commence preparatory strikes at 0810. Divisions may submit consolidated strike requests prior to 0830. The 3dMarDiv less RCT 21 is afloat in Expeditionary Troops reserve.
- 2. This Corps continues the attack at King-hour, 0810, 21 February 1945. The objective is the 0-2 line.

Boundary - present boundary extended, 199N to RJ 304A inclusive to 5thMarDiv at 199E to the corner of the airfield at 217M. LD (front lines at King-Hour)

- 3. a. The 4thMarDiv continues the attack in their zone of action and seizes the 0-2 line.
 - b. The 5thMarDiv continues the attack in their zone of action and seizes the 0-2 line and continues the attack to the South to capture MT. SURIBACHI.
 - c. RCT 21, afloat in Corps Reserve, will be prepared to land in the zone of action of the 4thHarDiv or 5thMarDiv on order.
 - d. No change.
 - e. No change.
 - f. No change.
 - x. No change.

- 4. No change.
- 5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHIT DT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 51 CTF 53 CTF 56 CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CO Corps Reserve CO 1st Prov AA Gp CO 138th AAA Gp CO VAC Shore Party CO Corps Troops

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field

21 February 1945

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of dispatch.

NUMBER 2-45

1. a. See my Op Order 1-45 and C-2 Summaries as issued.

b. Divs arrange for NGF preparation by own direct support ships assigned. Request to this Headquarters for NGF preparation desired above that furnished by direct support ships. No King Hour air strike group. Scheduled call strike group of 8 VF and 8 VT on station 0730. Make requests for air direct to CASCU. 3dMarDiv less RCT 21 afloat in ExTroPac reserve.

2. This Corps continues attack at King Hour 0835.

Objective O-2. Boundary between Divs, no change. LD (Front lines at King Hour)

3. a. 4thMarDiv continues attack in zone of action and scizes 0-2.

b. 5th MarDiv continues attack in zone of action and scizes 0-2 and continues attack to South to capture MT. SURI-BACHI. Make one Bn 13th Marines available to 4th Mar Div until 1200.

c. RCT 21 passes to control 4thMarDiv for attack. One RCT 4thMarDiv revert to Corps reserve when RCT 21 committed. CG 4thMarDiv designate RCT for Corps reserve and report assembly area. Corp reserve be prepared to attack in zone of action of 4th or 5th MarDivs.

- d. No change.
- e. No change.
- f. No change.
- x. No change.
- . No change.

. .

5.

No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colongl, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION

CTF 56 CTF 51 CTF 53 CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CO Corps Reserve CO 1st Prov FA Gp.

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3. V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Fieldi

22 February 1945

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of dispatch.

NUMBER 3-45

l. a. See C-2 Summaries as issued.

b. Divs arrange for NGF preparation desired above that furnished by direct support ships. No King hour air strike group. Comdr Support Carrier Gp 8 VF, 8 VT on station 0730 available for call missions. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 21) afloat in ExTroPac reserve. RCT 23 in Corps reserve.

2. This Corps continues attack at King hour 0730

Objective 0-2. Boundary between Divs no change. LD (Front lines at King hour).

3. a. 4thMar Div continue attack in Z of A, making main effort against Airfield No. 2 and seize 0-2.

b. 5thMarDiv continues attack in Z ofA, assists advance of 4thMarDiv by fire and seizes 0-2 and continues attack to capture remainder of MT. SURIBACHI. Make one Bn 13th Marines available to 4thMarDiv until 1600. Corps reserve be prepared to attack in Z of A of 4th or 5th MarDivs.

- c. No change.
- d. No change.
- e. No change.
- x. No change.
- 4. No change.

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5.

No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W.W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. MARINE CORPS, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG ExTro ComExpedFor ComAtkFor CG 4thMarDiv

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3. CG 5thMarDiv

CO RCT 23

CO 1st Prov FA Gp

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field

23 February 1945

OBERATION ORDER)

Brief of dispatch.

NUMBER. 4-45)

1. a. C-2 Summaries as issued.

b. Naval gunfire requested from King minus 75 to King minus 15 by fire from ships with 8 inch or heavier caliber for deliberate destruction fire against targets in target areas 199GHLM and 199JO, 200FKP, total of 600 rounds to be expended. It has been requested that maximum VT and VF strike target areas 1990, 200KP from King minus 15 to King hour. No call strike prior to King hour scheduled. Heaviest bombs available requested. Corps artillery will fire maximum concentration from King minus 30 to King hour on target areas 199OST and 200KPM with 150 rounds in each 200 yard target area. RCT 3 in ExTroPac reserve afloat. RCT 23 in Corps reserve.

- This Corps continues attack at King hour 0915. Initial objective general line 180E, 198M, 198J, 198H, Northwest road junction, 204A, 200F, 200R Northeast, 184F, 167B. Boundary between divisions present boundary from beach to present front line, thence 199V Southwest, 216W, 216M. Main effort along division boundary through target area 199 unit 199B, 216Q. Line of departure front lines at King hour.
- a. 4thMarDiv continue attack in zone of action making main effort on the left. Utilize reserve units in mopping up rear areas.
- b. 5thMarDiv continue attack in zone of action making main effort on the right. Utilize reserve units for mopping up rear areas including MT. SURIBACHI. 4th Bn 13th Marines available to 4thMarDiv until 1200.
- c. 3dMarDiv less RCTs 21 and 3 be prepared to land on order and assemble in area to be designated later, prepared to assume control of RCT 21 and continue the attack in the zone of action now assigned to that regiment.
- d. Corps reserve be prepared to attack in zone of action of either 4th or 5th MarDivs. Mop up area within limits of Airfield No. One including surrounding revetments particularly those with damaged planes or debris concealing snipers.

. e. Nò change.

f. No change.

x, (1) All available tanks except minimum requirements for other sectors will be employed in support of the main effort. Any necessary coordination between tanks of the 4th and 5th MarDivs will be effected by Tank Officer of 5thMarDiv.

(2) Employ bulk Div arty in support of main effort.

(3) Mark front lines from King minus 105 to King minus 75.

4. No change.

5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W.W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG ExTro ComAtkFor CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CG 3dMarDiv CO RCT 23 CO 1st Prov Field Arty Gp.

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3. 00108B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

24 February 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER. . .5-45)

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by CTF 53.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0930 25 February with 3 Divisions abreast making its main effort in the center. Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour), and division's zone of responsibility see Operation overlay.
- 3. a. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank continue attack in zone of action and capture objective 0-2 main effort on left. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv. RCT 23 reverts to 4thMarDiv at 0630.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center attack in zone of action and capture 0-2. 3dMarDiv take over responsibility for rear areas in zone of action at 1800 24 Feb. (See Overlay). Assume tactical control of RCT 21 at 0700 25 Feb.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less RCT 28) on left (West) flank continue attack in zone of action and capture objective 0-2. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv. Make available to artillery battalion previously supporting 4thMarDiv to 3dMarDiv until 1600 25 Feb.
- d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire preparations King minus 45 to King Hour firing not less than 1200 rounds with 600 rounds to 3dMarDiv and 300 rounds each to 4thMarDiv and 5th MarDiv. After K-hour furnish 50% supporting fires to 3dMarDiv. Remainder support equally divided between 4th and 5thMarDivs.
- e. RCT 28 in Corps Reserve effective 0630 25 Feb. Continue mopping up in MT SURIBACHI area. Be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv or 5thMarDiv. Reconnoiter routes to front lines prepared to move on short notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

T T C D. F.

f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action.

g. Garrison Forces ashore execute assigned base development missions as ordered.

x. In accordance with Operation Plan 3-44.

4. No change.

5. CPs 147R Headquarters VACLF, 3dMarDiv 164E, 4th MarDiv 164Y, 5thMarDiv 148G.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANDEKES:


ABLE: Operation Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56 CTF 53 CTF 51 CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CO Corps Arty
CO RCT 28
CO RCT 21
CO 38th AA Arty Gp
CG Garrison Forces
Shore Party Cmdr VACLF

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.



V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

25 February 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....6-45


Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IVO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Naval Attack Force Commander.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0800 26 February with 3 Divisions abreast:

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour), and Division's zone of responsibility: See operations overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank continue attack in zone of action and capture objective 0-2 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv. Make available one Artillery Bn to 3dMarDiv until 0700 26 February.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack in zone of action and capture 0-2 within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less RCT 28) on left (West) flank continue attack in zone of action and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv. Make available one Artillery Bn to 3dMarDiv until further notice.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 45 to King Hour firing not less than 1200 rounds with 600 rounds to 3dMarDiv and 300 rounds each to 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. After King Hour furnish 50% supporting fire to 3dMarDiv, remainder of support equally divided between 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.
- e. RCT 28 in Corps Reserve continue mopping up in MT SURIBACHI area. Be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv or 5thMarDiv. Reconnoiter routes to front lines prepared to move on short notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action.



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g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered.

- x. (1) In accordance my Operation Plan 3-44.
- (2) All divisions will push attack in all sectors of their zone of action consistent with resources available and tactical feasibility.
 - 4. No change.
 - 5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56	(1)	CO RCT 28 (1)
CTG 53	(1)-	138th AA Arty Gp (1)
CTF 51	(1)	CG Garrison Forces (1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF (1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Each General and Special(1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	Staff Section
CO Corps Arty	(1)	

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

> Libilay Armed forkls staff college

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

26 February 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

MUMBER....7-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Maval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Naval Attack Force Commander.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at 0800 27 February with 3 Divisions abreast.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank continue attack and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture C-2 within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less RCT 28) on left (West) flank continue attack and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 45 to King Hour firing not less than 1200 rounds with 600 rounds to 3dMarDiv and 300 rounds each to 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. After King Hour furnish 50% supporting fire to 3dMarDiv, remainder of support equally divided between 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.
- e. RCT 28 in Corps Reserve continue mopping up in MT SURIBACHI area. Be prepared to continue attack in 3dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv or 5thMarDiv. Reconnoiter routes to front lines prepared to move on short notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Artillery furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered.
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered.
 - x. (1) In accordance my Operation Plan 3-44.





(2) All Divisions will push the attack in all sectors of their zones consistent with resources available and tactical feasibility.

(3) Limited attacks should be made after consolidating for the night to secure terrain which is considered vital to the continuation of the attack the following day,

(4) Ground once gained will not be given up except under extreme pressure from the enemy.

4. No change.

5. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications) to be issued later.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:


ABLE: Operations Overlay BAKER: Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56 CTG 53 CTF 51 CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv	(1) (1) (1) (5) (5)	Č S	38th AA Arty Gp G Garrison Forces Shore Party Comdr VACLF Each General and Special Staff Section	(1) (1) (1) (1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)		ar Diary	(1) (50)
CO Corps Arty CO RCT 28	(2) (1)	Ŧ	p Report I L E	(50)

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.



024/150 Ser. 00114B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.



26 February, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 745.

1. a. Modify Annex HOW to Operation Plan No. 3-44 as follows:

b. Command Posts:

Lanfor	TA 147E
3rd MarDiv	TA 164E
4th MarDiv	TA 164Y
5th MarDiv	TA 148G
1st Prov FA Grp	TA 147R
138th AA Arty Grp	TA 147R
Garrison Force	USS Thurston
LanFor Reserve (RCT 28)	TA 147R
H&S Bn VAC (less dets)	TA 132L
Med Bn VAC	TA 123I
MT Co VAC	TA 132L
LanFor Air Spt Control Unit	TA 147R
Hq Prov LVT Gp	TA 148R
2d Sep Engr Bn (less dets)	TA 148N
62d NC Bn (3d Plat 2d Bomb	
Disposal Co atchd)	TA 164V
Cos A & B 23d NC Bn Spl	
8th Field Depot (less dets plus	
Hq Shore Party)	TA 148P
Corps Evac Hosp #1	TA 131E
2d Bomb Disposal Co (less 3d	,
Plat) (156th Bomb Disposal	• •
Squad attached)	TA 147R
Co B Amph Recon Bn	TA 147.8
38th Field Hosp (Reinf)	
Med Sec Civil Affairs	
JICPOA Int Team	
JICPOA Enemy Materiel and	•
Salvage Plat	TA 132E

- 2. a. (1). Units designated as Lanfor Reserve will enter Lanfor Command Nets. When the Reserve, or any element thereof, is committed to action, it will secure from Lanfor command nets and enter appropriate division or RCT command nets.
 - (2). The Mobile Communication Unit will assume Landing Force guard on the following circuits in the order shown:

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 7 -45 (Continued).

2. a. (2) (Continued).

CIRCUIT	FREQUENCY	EMISSION
Task Force Common	441 Kc	C₩
Local Air Warning	3465 Kc	- V
Task Group Common	` / 2032 Kc	CW .
Extropac Command	56 0 5	CM
Extropac Command	2 956	V

- (3). Communication Detachment, GroPac 11 will establish visual guard for LanFor Headquarters and for LanFor Shore Party Headquarters and set radio guard on harbor circuits.
- (4). The 568th AW Battalion (Reinf.) continue AW service to assault divisions and in addition set up AW facilities for the ADCC (AGATE). The ADCC will establish AW conditions and AA controls for the Landing Force and will be under control of the LanFor representative of CASCU ashore. AW and Control radio messages will be authenticated by the shackle system. Transmissions will take the following form:

"This is AGATE, Flash Red (Blue) (White) ashore (authenticator)."

"This is AGATE, Control Green (Yellow) ashore (authenticator),"

Telephone warning messages will specify originator of warning. Para. 3. a. (3), Annex LOVE to Operation Plan 3-44, effective.

b. Effective 1800, 27 February, 1945, Detachment 558th SAW Battalion, Detachment 726th SAW Company, and Detachment 44, 70th AACS, are released from operational control of Provisional Signal Group, VAC Lanfor, and are assigned to operational control of Gemmander Air Support Unit. Senior officers present will report to CASCU in Lanfor CP.

c. MESSAGE CENTER.

- (1). The JCC will operate with LanFor MsgCen.
- (2). Scheduled messenger service. See Appendix 3. this Annex.

d. RADIO.

(1). Those Headquarters having reliable telephone service with this Headquarters may secure on radio nets as desired except that a continuous watch will be maintained on 29.2 mcs. This Headquarters will maintain a continuous guard on all circuits.

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Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 79-45 (Continued).

2. e. <u>WIRE</u>.

- (1). Telephone trunks and Land Teletype Circuits. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
 - (2). Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Telephone Trunks and Land Teletype Circuits.
- 2. Line Route Map.
- 3. Scheduled Messenger Service.


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
Same as OpOrder No. 7-45.

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

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V Amohibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

Appendix 3 to Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 7 45.

- 1. Scheduled Officer Messenger service and Guard Mail runs leave LanFor Message Center to the following units at the following times:
 - 9. \$\phi \text{3rd Division, 4th Division, 5th Division and LanFor Shore Party.}
 - 1200 3rd Division, 4th Division, 5th Division and Lanfor Shore Party.

1600 3rd Division, 4th Division, 5th Division and LanFor Shore Party.

2000 3rd Division, 4th Division, 5th Division and LanFor Shore Party.

- b. From LanFor Message Center to Corps Reserve with operation orders and special runs as necessary.
- c. From USS Auburn to Lanfor CP at \$8\$\$ and 18\$\$.
- 2. The above schedule may be changed in order to meet traffic needs.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMUDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as Operation Order No. 7-45.

OFFICIA

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C-3. V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

27 February 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....8-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at 0815 28 February with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- a. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank continue attack and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Continue the attack to 0-3 on Division Order. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Continue the attack to 0-3 on Division Order. Maintain contact with 5thMarDiv. Prepare to release artillery battalion from 5thMarDiv on order.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less RCT 28) on left (West) flank continue attack and capture 0-2 within zone of action. Continue the attack to 0-3 on Division Order.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 45 to King Hour firing not less than 1200 rounds with 600 rounds to 3dMarDiv and 300 rounds each to 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. After King Hour furnish 50% supporting fire to 3dMarDiv, remainder of support equally divided between 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.
- e. RCT 28 in Corps Reserve continue mopping up in MT SURIBACHI area with one Bn. Move one of the two Bns remaining in MT SURIBACHI area to assembly area vicinity 181 GEORGE FOX by 1500. Be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3dMarDiv, 4thMarDiv or 5thMarDiv. Reconnoiter routes to front lines prepared to move on short notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Artillery furnish AA protection in Corps zone
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered.

SFAR

- x. (1) Maintain contact from right to left.
- (2) All Divisions will push the attack in all sectors of their zones consistent with resources available and tactical feasibility.
- (3) Limited attacks should be made after consolidating for the night to secure terrain which is considered vital to the continuation of the attack the following day.
- (4) Ground once gained will not be given up except under extreme pressure from the enemy.
 - (5) See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.
 - 4. No change.
 - 5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:

	•	
CTF 56	(1)	138th AA Arty Gp (1)
CTG 53	(1)	CG Garrison Forces (1)
CTF 51	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF- (1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each General and Special (1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Staff Section
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	War Diary \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
60 Corps Arty	(2)	Op Report (50)
CO RCT 28	(1)	FILE

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACOfS, C - 3...

S.F.

CDE В G Annex ABLE N 246 S KANGOKU ROCK HANARE ROCK HIRAIWA BAY 213 KAMA ROCK 196 179 EAST BOAT BASIN BCDE G F 79 80 -81 82 -L M N Q P Q R S Annex ABLE TO V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS LANDING FORCE U VWX OPERATION ORDER No. 8-45 27 FEBRUARY 1945 FUTATSU ROCK (Overprinted on map from corresponding operation order overlay) BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT W. W. ROGERS Colonel, USMC Official: Chief of Staff 74 78 E. A. CRAIG SCALE IN YARDS Col., USMC RF = 1:20,000 AC of S, G-3 1000 2000

013/124 00120B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

g m a n n

28 February 1945.

DEERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....9-45)

Maps:

1.37333

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander. Ammunition allowance for direct support ships limited to 500 rds AA Common and 75 rds starshells per 24-hour period. Details on ammunition allowance for general support ships later.

- (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue attack at 0830 1 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

a. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank continue attack. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv on left. Maintain present positions south of Grid Line 74 except as necessary to maintain contact with left elements. Assemble one Bn in Corps Reserve by 1200 in 4thMarDiv zone of action south of Grid Line 73 and report unit and location.

b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 5thMarDiv. Release Arty Bn from 5thMarDiv to its parent organization effective 1800 28 February.

- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 2/27) on left (West) flank continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. RCT 28 released to 5thMarDiv effective •600 l March.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 45 to King Hour firing not less than 400 rounds in support each Div. After King Hour furnish supporting fires equally to all Divs as requested.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- QUEEN ROGER released to 5thMarDiv effective 0600 1 March.

SECPE

(2) BLT 2/27 continue mopping up MT SURIBACHI area and West Coast South of Grid Line 72. Be prepared to assemble on two hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Torps.

f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered.

g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered.

- x. (1) Maintain contact from right to left.
- (2) Ground once gained will not be given up except under extreme pressure from the enemy.
- (3) See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44 effective as herein modified.
 - 4. No change.
 - 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:


ABLE: Operations Overlay. BAKER: Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:


CTF 56	(1)	138th AA Arty Gp	(1)
CTG 53	(1)	CG Garrison Forces	(1)
CTF 51	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each General and Special	(1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Staff Section	
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	War Diary	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)	Op Report	(50)
CO RCT 28	(1)	FILE	
CO BLT 2/27	(1)		

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.



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V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

28 February, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 9-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

1. Telephone poles must be cleared eventually of following areas:

Target Areas: 148 ABCDFGH, 164 BCDHIJMNORS TUVWX, 165 BCDEGHYLBU,

182 BCDEGHKTX, 183 ABCDE, 184 ABCDE, 199 UVWXY,

200 IJMNOPQRUVWXY, 201 ABFGKUVWXY, 218 NOSTVWXY,

219 KPQU.

All poles must be immediately cleared of No. 1 Airfield by 100 feet unless defiladed. All poles must be cleared of No. 2 Airfield in the same manner prior to use of that field.

- 2. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
- 3. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Ampendix 2, this Annex).
- 4. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).
- 5. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 4, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corres Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Teletype Circuit Diagram.
- 3. Line Route Map.
- 4. Scheduled Messenger Service.

024/153 Ser. 00120B

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 9-45 (Continued).

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
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
3rd MarDiv	4	Det 44 70th AACS	1
4th MarDiv	4	SigDet, JICPOA Salvage	ī
5th MarDiv	4	Det 568th AWBn	14
VAC SigBn	1 4	138th AA Grp	1
LF SP Plt	1	1st Prov FA Grp	1
DetCommUnit 434		IsCom	Į
(GroPac 11)	1	HqProLVT Grp	l
SigCo, 8thFD	1	CASCU, Ashore	. 1
DetSigHqCo, IsCom	1	HqProvSigGrp	6
DetMobileCommUnit			
(Army)	2	FILE	10
Det 49thSigConstBn	1	•	

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
E. A. CRAIG,

Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C-3.





APPENDIX 3 Annex Baker to Operation Order 9-45 Teletype Circuit Diagram LanFor Consolidated Effective 1200, % February, 1945



024/153 Ser. 00/20B



V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

28 February, 1945.

Appendix 4, to Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 9-45.

SCHEDULED MESSENGER SERVICE

1. Scheduled Officer Messenger service and Guard Mail runs leave LanFor Message Center to the following units:

Leave Message Center:	0800	1200	1600	2000
	ARRI VE	ARRI VE	ARRIVE	ARRI VE
5th MarDiv 4th MarDiv 3rd MarDiv Shore Party	0815 0840 0910 0940	1215 1240 1310 1340	1615 1640 1710 '	2015 2040 2110 2140

Departures are ten minutes later at each place.

- 2. Special runs to Corps Reserve with Operation Orders and others as necessary.
- 3. To USS AUBURN, two runs are made daily each way.

Leave USS AUBURN Arrive MsgCen	0800 0900	1500 1600
Leave MsgCen	1000	1700
Arrive USS AUBURN	1100	1800

THE T

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

1 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER...10-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander. Ammunition allowance for direct support ships limited to 500 rounds AA common and 75 rounds starshells per 24-hour period until further notice.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at 0800 2 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 2/23) on right (East) flank continue attack. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv on left. Maintain present positions south of grid line 74 except as necessary to maintain contact with left elements.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 2/27) on left (West) flank continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Make main effort on right. Maintain contact with 3rd MarDiv.
- d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 30 to King minus 15 and King minus 10 to King Hour firing not less than 1200 rounds with 600 rounds in support 5th MarDiv and 300 rounds each in support 3dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv. After King Hour furnish 50% supporting fire to 5thMarDiv, remainder of support divided 2/3 to 3dMarDiv and 1/3 to 4thMarDiv.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- (1) BLT 2/27 continue mopping up MT SURIBACHI area and that portion of West coast contained in Corps area. (See Operations Overlay). Be prepared to assemble on 2 hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

SEC

(2) BLT 2/23 in assembly area 182 VICTOR WILLIAM be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 2 hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered. Fire on outlying islands as directed,

g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.

x. (1) 4th and 5th MarDiv maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.

(2) See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44, effective except as herein modified.

- 4. No change.
- 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay.
BAKER: Signal Communications.


DISTRIBUTION:

	•		•	
CTF 56	(1)		138th AA Arty Gp	(1)
CTG: 53	(1)		CG Garrison Forces	(T)
CTF 51	(1)		Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)		Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	• •	Each Special Staff Sec	4 - 1
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)		(less overlay)	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2).		War Diary	(1)
CO BLT 2/23	(1)		Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 2/27	(1)		FILE	

OPPRIOTATE:

E. A. CRAIC, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.





V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

1 March, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 10-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- 1. All signal equipment requiring repair including unserviceable field wire will be turned in to the 8th Field Depot for salvage upon termination of the assault phase and prior to departure from the island.
- 2. During periods of enemy shelling or bombing of CP areas, radio testing is forbidden.
- 3. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
- 4. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 5. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).
- 6. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 4, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Teletype Circuit Diagram.
- 3. Line Route Map.
- 4. Scheduled Messenger Service.


DISTRIBUTION:


Same as OpOrder No. 1	0-45 olus:		
3rd MarDiv	Ъ.	138th AA Group	1
4th MarDiv	Ħ	1st Prov FA Group	1
5th MarDiv	Jt.	IsCom	1
VAC SigBn	<i>.</i> 14	HqProvLVT Group	1
LF SP Plt	1	CASCU, Ashore	1
SigCo, 8thFD	1	SigO, FMF PAC	. 2
DetMobileCommUnit		HoProvSigGrp	6
(Army)	2 '	FILE	10

OFFICIAL:


E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC,

ACofS, C - 3.





APPENDIX 3 Annex Baker to Operation Order 10-45 Teletype Circuit Diagram LamFor Consolidated Effective 1200, 1 March, 1945



V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

1 March, 1945.

Appendix 4 to Angex FiKER to Operation Order No. 10-45.

SCHEDULED MESSENGER SERVICE

1. Scheduled Officer Messenger service and Guard Mail runs leave the LanFor. Message Center for the following units in accordance with the following schedule.

Le,ave	MsgCen:	фвфф	1200	16 ø ø	1845	19 ¢ ¢
Arrive	5thMar Div	Ø815	1215	1615	1900	جعادي
. 11	4thMar Div	Ø814Ø	1240	164ø	1920	وهو يون فاد
. 11	3rdMar.Div	Ø91Ø	12 1 ø	171ø		1925
55	Shore Party &	Ø94Ø	1240	174ø	, ————	
#	LVT Group	187	· · ·	,		
11	07G 10.13	ø 95 ø	125Ø	175¢		194Ø
•	(Garri sonForce)	,				
\$1	Corns Res.	ø 955	1255	1755		195Ø
tr	ittack Force	$\phi \hat{s} \hat{\phi} \hat{\phi}$	11ØØ	13ØØ	16øø	
n	Corps Arty	Ø 8Ø5	1205	16Ø5	185Ø	
. 11	AA Arty	9 815	1215	1615	19øø	

- 2. Although this schedule is primarily designed for dispatch delivery other matter may be carried provided no delay in effecting the above schedule is involved.
- 3. The 1845 and 2000 runs may be utilized by divisions for delivery of summaries to the Landing Force.

V Amph bious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

A D A D D

2 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER...11-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- l. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack in echelon on 3 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture C-3. King Hour 0745. The 4thMarDiv will attack at King minus 75. 3dMarDiv and 5thMarDiv will attack at King Hour.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 2/23) on right (East) flank continue the attack at King minus 75 and capture 6-3 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv on left.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center, continue attack at King Hour and capture 0-3 within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 2/27) on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour and capture 0-3 within zone of action, with particular attention to high ground in zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv. Relieve all 3dMarDiv elements in 5th MarDiv zone of action by 1000.
- d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire preparation for 4thMarDiv from King minus 90 to King minus 75 firing not less than 400 rounds. Fire preparation for 3dMarDiv and 5thMarDiv from King minus 25 to King Hour firing not less than 400 rounds in support of each Division. After King Hour furnish supporting fires equally to all Divisions as requested.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- (1) BLT 2/27 continue mopping up MT SURIFACHI area and that portion of West Coast contained in Corps area (See Operations Overlay). Be prepared to assemble on 2 hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 2 hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

(Contt)

g tr g p m m

f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered. Fire on outlying islands as directed.

g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.

x. (1) 4th and 5th MarDivs maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.

(2) 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv authorized to utilize 3dMarDiv zone of action for purpose of troop movement and supply of flank elements provided timely advance notification is given 3dMarDiv.

(3) See paragraph 3x my Operation Order 344, effective except as herein modified.

- 4. No change.
- 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

 BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay. BAKER: Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56 CTG 53 CTF 51 CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv	(1) (1) (1) (5) (5) (5)	138th AA Arty Gp CG Garrison Forces Shore Party Comdr VACLF Each Gen Staff Section Each Special Staff Sec (less overlay) War Diery	(1) (1) (1) (1)
CO Corps Arty	(5) (2)	(less overlay) War Diary	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$
CO BLT 2/23 CO BLT 2/27	(1)	Op Report	(50)

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CAAIG, COLONEL, USMC, ACOTS, C - 3.

014/153 Ser.00132B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

2 March, 1945

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 11-45.

SIGHAL COMMUNICATIONS

- Effective 1200, 3 March, 1945, 3rd Marine Division transfer the following personnel from 3rd JASCO to Operational dontrol of LANFOR SP:
 Nine linemen, one Wire Team Chief, three radio operators (776), two
 Message Center Clerks, one Message Center Chief. Administrative control
 to be with Whird JASCO. In event of departure of Third JASCO prior
 relief of LANFOR SHORE PARTY the above men to be put on temporary duty
 with Third Division element on temporary Carrison duty.
- 2. The Code name WORKMAN is classified secret and must not be used as a call or code name, or be mentioned in plain language despatches of any kind.
- 3. (a) V sual calls established by Gropac II are as follows:
 H-1 Harbor Entrance Control Post stands guard for Force Beachmaster
 LANFOR Shore Party Commander.

H-6 Island Commander stands guard for CG Garrison Force (CTG 10.13), CG LanFor (CTG 56.1).

H-1 is located at Red Beach Two (TA-1480).

H-6 is located at the LanFor CP and is installed at TA-147R.

H- φ can operate either with ships off the East or West Coast of Iwo Jima.

- (b) Gropac 11 has installed the following radio stations at Beach Red Two.
 - 1. 2716 kcs Harbor circuit call Nan Dog Charlie.
 - 2. 34.8 mcs Harbor circuit Call Nan Dog Charlie
 - 3. 29.2 mcs LanFor Command Call Nan Dog Charlie.



SFCPP

2 March, 1945

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 11-45 (Continued)

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS (CONTINUED)

- 4, Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
- 5. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 6. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Teletype Circuit Diagram.
- 3. Line Route Map.

DISTRIBUTION:


Same as OpOrder No.	11-45:	•			
3rd MerDiv		4	• .	138th AA Group	1
4th MarDiv		4		1st Prov FA Group	1
5th MarDiv		4		Iscom GarFor	l
VAC SigBn		4		HgProvLVT Group	1
LF SP Plt		1		CASCU, Ashorè	l
SigCo, 8thFD		1		SigO, FMF Pac	2
DetMobileCommUnit	(Army)	2		HqProvSigGrp	6
*				F T T. TC	n o

OFFICIAL:


E. A. CRAIG,

Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C-3.






Appendix A Annex Baker to Operation Order Il -45 Teletype Circuit Diagram LanFor Consolidated Exfective 1200, 2 March, 1945



PURPLE BEACH SHO I PA TY Appendix SCALE 1-10,000 SPECIAL AIR & GUNNERY TARGET MAP EFFECTIVE 1200, 2 MARCH, 1945 to Annex Baker Lanfor Opr. Oder No. 11-45 386 186 RED 2 # SE XX



013/124 00137B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

T C P T.

3 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....12-45)

- 1. a. Sec Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
 - 2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0730 4 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 2/23) on right (East) flank continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 2/27) on left (West) flank continue attack, seize high ground to the Northeast and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire preparation King minus 35 to King Hour firing not less than 300 rounds in support of each Division. After King Hour furnish supporting fires equally to all divisions as requested.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- (1) BLT 2/27 continue mopping up MT SURIBACHI area and that portion of West Coast contained in Corps area (See Operations Overlay). Be prepared to assemble on 2 hours notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- (2) BLT 2/23 in assembly area 182 VICTOR WILLIAM be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered. Fire on outlying islands as directed.
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.

x. (1) 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv authorized to utilize 3dMarDiv zone of action for purpose of troop movement and supply of flank elements giving timely advance notification to 3dMarDiv.

(2) See paragraph 3x my Operation Order 3-44, effective except as herein modified.

- 4. No change.
- 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:


ABLE: Operations Overlay.
BAKER: Signal Communications.


DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56 CTG 53 CTF 51	(1) (1) (1)	138th AA Arty Gp CG Garrison Forces Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1) (1) (1)
CG 3dMarDiv.	(5)	Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	(less overlay)	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)	War Diary	(1)
CO BLT 2/23	(1)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 2/27	(1)	FILE	

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.





V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field 3 March, 1945

Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 12-45

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- ... 1. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
 - 2. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
 - 3. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 3. this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- l. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Line Route Map.
- 3. Teletype Circuit Diagram.

DISTRIBUTION

Same as OpOrder No. 11-45 plus:


Con


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4th MarDiv	14	1st Prov FA Group	1
5th MarDiv	4	IsGom GarFor	1
VAC SigBn	4	HaProvLVT Group	1
LF SP Plt	ı	CASCU Ashore	1
SigCo, 8thFD	1	SigO, FMF Pac	2
DetMobileCommUnit (Army)	2 ·	Oper Reports	50
HaProvSieGro	6	मी राज्य	íο

OFFICIAL:


E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C-3.

S





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013/124 00143B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

SFADDE

5 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER...13-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. ä. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Join't Expeditionary Force Commander. Naval Gunfire will reinforce the artillery preparation for the attack.
 - (2) RCT 3 afloat in ExTroPac Reserve.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack in echelon on a limited front on 5 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3. King Hour 0800. The 5thMarDiv will attack at King Hour. The 3d MarDiv will attack at King Hour and at King plus 60. The 4thMarDiv will attack at King plus 60.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour), artillery preparation zones of fire: See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/23) on right (East) flank continue the attack at King Hour plus 60 and capture the high ground in the left of its zone of action. Make main effort on extreme left of zone of action. Units on right maintain contact with elements making main effort.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Attack at King Hour in left of zone of action and seize high ground to front in conjunction with 5thMarDiv. Units on right support attack by fire. At King plus 60 attack in right of zone of action and seize Hill 362 TA 219 UNCLE.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 1/28) on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour and capture the high ground to the northeast within zone of action in conjunction with 3dMarDiv. Units on left maintain contact with elements making main effort and support main effort by fire.
- d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire preparation in accordance with Annex CHARLIE. Divisional artillery provide fires called for in artillery plan of fires. Corps Artillery furnish supporting fires equally to all divisions as requested after King plus 81.



e. Corps Reserve.

- (1) BLT 1/28 continue mopping up MT SURIBACHI area and that portion of West Coast contained in Corps area (See Operations Overlay). Be prepared to assemble on 2 hours notice. Maintain close Liaison with Corps.
- (2) BLT 1/23 in assembly area 182 VICTOR WILLIAM be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action as ordered. Fire on outlying islands as directed.
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.
- x. (1) 4th and 5th MarDivs maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- (2) 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv authorized to utilize 3dMarDiv zone of action for purpose of troop movement and supply of flank elements provided timely advance notification is given 3dMarDiv.
- (3) Front line elements will take adequate cover during artillery preparation fires.
 - (4) See paragraph 3x my Operation Order 3-44.
 - 4. Current Administrative Orders apply.



. _5.

a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.

b, See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay.

BAKER: Signal Communications.

CHARLIE: Artillery Plan of Fires.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56	(1)	138th AA Arty Gp	(1)
CTG 53	(1)	CG Garrison Forces	(1)
CTF 51	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF	
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	(less overlay)	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)	War Diary	(1)
CO BLT 1/23	(1)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 1/28	(1)	FILE	

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.



V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field;

5 March. 1945.

Annex Baker to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

command posts:

(a) LanFor Order:	
LanFor	TA-147 <u>R</u>
3rd MarDiv	TA-182P
4th MarDiv	TA-164Y
5th MarDiv	TA-181R
1st Prov FA Grp	TA-147R
LF Reserve (2/23)	TA-182VW
LF Reserve (1/28)	TA-132F
H&S Bn VAC (less dets)	TA-147R
Med Bn VAC	TA-132H
MTCO VAC	TA-147R
$\mathtt{H}_{\mathtt{G}}\mathtt{ProvLVT}$ \mathtt{Grp}	TA-148E
2ndSenEngrBn	TA-132A
8thFldDepot (less dets	
plus HoShoreParty)	TA-148E
Coros Evac Hospital #1	TA-147V
2ndBombDisnCo(less 3dPlt)	
(156thBombDispSqdAtchd)	TA-1320
CoB AmphRoconBn	TA-147R
MedSec Civil Affairs	TA-1,47R
JICPOA IntTeam	TA-147R
JICPOA Enemy material and	- 1
Salvage Detachment	TA-147R
HqProv DUKW Grp	TA-163R
(b) Garrison Units:	
Garrison Force	TA-132A
138th AA Arty Grp	TA-147R
62nd NCBn (3rd Plt 2ndBomb	m. = 1, ~ =
DispCoAttached)	TA-148J

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45 (Continued)


1. COMMAND POSTS (CONTINUED)

(b)	Garrison Units (Continued)	
	CosA&B 23rd NC Bn	
	38th Field Hosp (Reinf)	TA-181F
	JĈĈ	TA-147R
	Grobac 11	TA-132A
	Garrison Beach Party	TA-163R
	Port Director	TA-132E

(c) Fightes Command Units:
7th FC TA-132E
ASCU TA-147R
ADCC TA-147R
70th AACS TA-164S
386th Service Group TA-164H

- 2. All organizations are requested to maintain road crossings of telephone wire and cable at heights of not less than 16 feet above the ground.
- 3. Attention of all organizations is invited to the necessity for sighting registered publications in their possession, ashore and making immediate reports of discrepancies as they occur.
- 4. After the Island is declared secure and prior to re-embarkation, communication liaison teams and other elements of the Corps Signal Battalion now in a temporary duty status with divisions will be returned to their permanent organization without further orders.
- 5. Joint Assault Signal Companies will remain in present status with divisions with no change in administrative or operational control.
- 6. Shore Parties, Transport Quartermasters and ships who are temporarily employing communication personnel of the Landing Force or Garrison. Force for working parties are requested to release those personnel immediately to their organization.
- 7. Add the following radio circuit to those shown in America 9 to Annex HOW to VAC Lanfor OpOrder No. 3-44:

Support Air Observation (SAO-3)(3rd MarDiv) - 2682 kc.



Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45 (Gentinued)

8. Effective Codes and Ciphers for use by Landing Force Units ashore are as follows:

TOMS		•
Crypto Aid No.	CRYPTO AID Long Title	Short Title
1.	Combined Assault Code	CCBP 0130-D2
2.	Hagelin Gryptographic Hag Key List #7	CSP 1500 (M209) CSP 1507 (SigTri 21) (JY) effective
3.	Aircraft Code #16 (Pacific)	CSP 1270 (DD1) effective 1 March to 6 March
4.	Shore Fire Control Code	CSP 2156(B) (or VAC LanFor General Order No. 71-44, Combined Naval Gunfire and Artillery Fire Control Code which contains CSP 2156(B)
5•	Fighter Director Vocabulary	CCBP 11-2
6.	Instructions for Fighter directors	CSP 1292
7•	Numeral Code	Shackle Code LIST "A" CentCom TWO Change TWO effective
8.	Visual Code	Para 3410, Appendix 1, Annex G
9•	Panel System	CCBP8(nlus 6320 of CentCom TWO
10.	Shackle Authentication System	Para 2400 Appendix 1, Annex G, CentCom TWO, Change 2 and effective Shackle words 2401.



Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45 (Continued)

8. (Continued).

Crypto Aid No.	Long Title	Short Title
11.	Front Line Marking System	Para 6321 of Annex G, CentCom TWO, Change 2
12.	Indian Talkers	To bring to radio for transmission say "INDIAN TALKER"

9. Special distribution of a corrected telephone directory is being made to all Landing Force and Garrison Units. Purple Beach Numbers not shown in the directory have been assigned as follows:

```
Beach Purple One 6- - - - - - Colonel SHERMAN

Beach Purple One 42 - - - - Beachmaster Lt. STUNKARD

Beach Purple One 90 - - - - Water Dump-Colonel SEEDS

Beach Purple One 91 - - - - Purple Beach Evacuation

Hospital-Commander CLAPP

Beach Purple One 33 - - - - - Prov. DUKW Group
```

10. The JCC holds Cryptographic Aids as follows:

Aid No.	System	Short Title
1.	Hagelin (Jt)	·CSP 1607
2.	Strip (Navy)	CS⊇ 1039, 1040
3∙	Strip (Navy)	CSP 1409, 1410
4.	Strip (Jt)	CSP 1145, 1146
5•	Strip (Army)	SIGICRA-16
5• 6•	Strip (Army)	SIGHUBL-21
7•	Strip (Army)	2122
g•	Hagelin (Army)	2161
9•	Assault Code (Jt)	
10.	Aircraft Code Pacif	fic CSP 1270

- 11. Radio circuits have been established by the JCC, ADCC, AACS and GroPac 11 as shown in Appendix 1.
- 12. Plain language messages sent by LanFor organizations via any agency should contain one of the following phrases in the text "This is Secret, Confidential, or Restricted".

014/153 Ser. 00143B

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45 (Continued)

- Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 2, this Annex). 13.
- 14. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).
- Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 4, this Annex). 15.
- 16. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 5, this Annex).
- 17. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 6, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS. Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps. Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- Garrison Radio Circuits.
- 2. Circuit Diagram.
- 3. Line Route Map.
- Teletype Circuit Diagram.
- 5. Traffic Diagram.6. Scheduled Messenger Service.


DISTRIBUTION:

Same	as Operation	Order Number	r 13-45	plus:	
	3rdMarDiv	Ъ.		138th AA Group	1
• 1	4thMarDiv	· 4		1stProv FA Group	1
	5thMarDiv	Ъ		IsCom GarFor	1
	VAC SigBn	, 4 , ,		HqProvLVTGroup	1
	LFSP Plt	1		CASCU Ashore	1
• 	SigCo, 8thFD:	30.10 1 1 3		SigO, FMF Pac	, 2
	DetMobileCommI	Jni t		HqProvSigGrp	16
·	(Army)	2		FILE	10

Control Description

E. A. CHAIG. Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

014/177 Ser. 00143B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field







Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Operation Order No. 13-45.


1. The following garrison radio circuits have been established:


JCC:	Task Force Common Local Warning Fifth Fleet TF	441 3465 4205	Air O	p Intelligence	4385 8770 13155
	Island Command	422 1770	ADCC:	Inter Fighter Director	37.6 2096
	Major Air Tactical	3710 7135 11130		Local Warning SAD-1	3465 140.58
		13170		SAD-2 FD-Obj.Area	142.02 142.74
	Oper Pt-to-Pt	5370 8880		•	2 - 2 - 1
	Jump Fox	12395 106 4125	GROP!	AC 11: Harbor Circuits	2716 34.8
		8250 12375 16500		Local Warning LF Command	3465 29 . 2
	International Calling and Distress	500 468	70TH	AACS: SAD-2 SAD(Secondary)	140.58 5135
	Island Base Net Island Base Air Tactica	2630 1 2616 5320			
	Task Group Common	2032		•	







Appendix 2 Annex Baker to Operation Order No. 13-45 Telephone Circuit Diagram
Effective 1200, 5 March, 1945
Garrison Forms: Phase













Appendix 5 Annex Beker to Operation Order No. 13-45 Telephone Traffic Diagram
Effective 1200, 5 March, 1945



014/153 Ser. 00143B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.



5 March 1945.

Appendix 6 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45.

SCHEDULED MESSENGER SERVICE

1. Officer Messenger Service and Guard Mail runs leave the LanFor Message Center for the following units ashore (via Jeep):

Leave Message Center	0 800	1200	1600	1845	1900
Arrive 5th MarDiv Arrive 4th MarDiv Arrive 3rd MarDiv Arrive ShoreParty & LVT Grp Arrive CTG 10.13 (GarFor) Arrive Corps Reserve	0815 0840 0910 0940 1000 1010	1215 1240 1310 1340 1400 1410	1615 1640 1710 1740 1800 1810	1900	1925 1950 2010 2020
Arrive Message Center	1015	1415	1815	1940	2025


2. Local runs to outside units (via runner):

Leave Message Center	0800	1200	1600	1900
Arrive Corps Arty	0 805	1205	1605	1905
Arrive AA Arty	0810	1210	1610	1910
Arrive Message Center	0815	1215	1615	1915

3. Officer Messenger and Guard Mail service runs leave the LanFor Message Center for the following units afloat (via SigBn DUKW):

Leave Message Center	0700	0900	1300 ·	
Arrive CTF 53	0730			1630
Leave CTF 53	0745	0945	1345	1645
Arrive Message Center	0815	1015	1415	1715

- 4. Although the above schedules are primarily designated for delivery of dispatch traffic, other matter may be carried, provided no delay is involved.
- 5. The 1845 and 1900 runs may be utilized by divisions for delivery of summaries to the Landing Force.



013/124 00143B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

5 March 1945.

Annex CHARLIE to VACLF Operation Order 13-45.

ARTILLERY PLAN OF FIRES

Map: Air and Gunnery Tar

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. See VACLF Operation Order 15-45.

2. Artillery with the Corps will support the attack of VACLF 6 March 1945. For firing areas and sectors see Appendix 1 to this Annex.

3. a. (1) 14th Marines will fire preparation in Sector R as follows:

Area	Time	Rate Rd/gun/min	Bns	Remarks
Zone 2A	K-10 to K	5	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Dolay
Zone 2B	K to K≠7	2	3	
Zone 20	K/7 to K/14	2 2	3	
Zone 2D	K/14 to $K/21$	2	3	
and in Sec	tor U		:	
Zone 1A	K / 45 to K / 50	5	3	Be prepared to fire 50% WP if wind favorable
· · ·	: ·			on Corps order 35% Fuze Quick 35% Fuze Delay
Zone 1A	K/55 to K/60	5	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 1B	K ≠60 to K ≠67	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 10	K/67 to K/74	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 1D	K/74 to K/81	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			•

(2) The 13th Marines will fire preparation in


Sector P as follows:

Area	Time	Rate Rd/gun/min	Bns	Remarks
*Zone 2A	K≗10 to K	5	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 2B	K to K≠7	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay

D E O R E				
Area	Time	Rate Rās/gun/min'	Bns	Remarks
Zone 20	K/7 to K/14	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 2D	K≠14 to K≠21	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
and in Sec	ctor S			
Zone LA	K √ 45 to K √ 50	5	3	Be prepared to fire 30% VP if wind is favorable and on Corps order 35% Fuze Quick 35% Fuze Delay
Zone 1A	K≠55 to K≠60	5	3	50% Fuze Quick . 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 1B	K/60 to K/67	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 10	$K \neq 67$ to $K \neq 74$.	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 1D	K ≠ 74 to K≠ 81	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay

(3) The 12th Marines will fire preparation in Sector ${\bf Q}$ as follows:

Area	Time	Rate rds/gun/min	Bns	Remarks
Zone 2A	K-lo to K	5	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 2B	K to K≠7	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 2C.	K/7 to K/14	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
Zone 2D	K≠14 to K≠21	2	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
and in Sec	ctor T	•		•
Zone 1A	K≠45 to K ≠50	5	3	Be prepared to fire 30% WP if wind is favorable and on Corps Order
Zone lA	K≠55 to K≠60	5	3	35% Fuze Quick 35% Fuze Delay 50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay



. D	T				
Area	Time	Rate Rds/gun/min	Bns	Remarks	
Zone 1B	K≠60 to K≠67	2	3	50% Fuze Quick	
Zone 10	K/67 to K/74	2	3	50% Fuze Delay 50% Fuze Quick	
Zöne 1D	K≠74 to K≠81	2	3	50% Fuze Delay 50% Fuze Quick	

b. Corps Arty will fire approximately 2500 rounds in preparation for the attack in support of the VACLF. Two Bns will fire in Zone 2, Sectors P, Q and R as follows:

Area	Time	Rate	Romarks
A line B	K-10 to K	3	50% Fuze Quick
B line C	K to K≠7	1	50% Fuze Delay 50% Fuze Quick
C line D	K/7 to K/14	1	50% Fuze Delay 50% Fuze Quick 5 6 % Fuze Delay
D line	K ≠14 to K≠21	1	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
and in Zone	e 1, Sectors S. T	U.	
A line B	K/45 to K/50	3	Be prepared to fire 30% WP if wind is favorable and on Corps Order.
· .			35% Fuze Quick 35% Fuze Delay
A line B	K/55 to K/60	3	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
B line C	K/60 to K/67	1	50% Fuze Quick
C line D	K/67 to K/74	1	50% Fuze Delay 5 0 % Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay
D line	K/74 to K/81	1	50% Fuze Quick 50% Fuze Delay

x. (1) At K plus 81 12th 13th and 14th Marines resume normal support missions of their divisions.

(2) Registrations. 12th Marines will register 13th Marines an Sector S of Zone 1.

12th Marines will register 14th Marines in Sector R of Zone 2.

13th Marines will register 12th Marines in

Sector Q of Zone 2.

50% Fuze Delay



(3) Each division artillery will retain control of one battalion during periods listed in paragraph 3 for emergency missions.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

1. Overlay Plan of Fires.

de laura


DISTRIBUTION:

Same as VACLF Operation Order 15-45.

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

SER



013/124 00156B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force ? In the Field.

SECO

6 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....14-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0730 7 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture 0-3.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/23) on right (East) flank continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Make main effort on the left.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Make main effort to capture Hill 362, TA 219 UNCLE, and high ground on 0-3.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 1/28) on left (West) flank continue attack and capture 0-3 within zone of action. Make main effort to capture high ground to the northeast in zone of action.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Corps Artillery will be employed only for deliberate destruction fires against known enemy installations.

e. Corps Reserve.

- (1) BLT 1/28 discontinue present mission in MT SURIBACHI area and commence movement to assembly area in 199 DOG and 216 XRAY at 0700 7 March. Report arrival in new area and be prepared to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- (2) BLT 1/23 in assembly area 182 VICTOR WILLIAM be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action. Fire on outlying islands as ordered.
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.

a F A R E T

x. (1) 4th and 5th MarDivs maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.

(2) 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv authorized to utilize 3dMarDiv zone of action for purpose of troop movement and supply of flank elements provided timely advance notification is given 3dMarDiv.

(3) Divisions make every effort to conserve artillery ammunition.

(4) See paragraph 3x my Operation Order 3-44, except as herein modified.

- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply.
- 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:


ABLE: Operations Overlay.
BAKER: Signal Communications.


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CTG 53	(1)	CG Garrison Forces	(1)
CTF 51	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF	. (1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	(less overlay)	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)	War Diary	(1)
CO BLT 1/23	(1)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 1/28	(1)	FILE	

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.







6 March, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order No. 14-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- 1. (a). 4685 kcs is assigned the 4th Marine Division Reconnaissance Net.
 - (b). Channel 33 (46.6 mcs). SCR-300 is assigned the Provisional DUKW Group on a non interference basis.
- 2. All organizations are requested to salvage W-110 telephone circuits including artillery lines, local CP lines and all lines on the ground which are no longer in use for transfer to the Signal Company of the 8th Field Depot. The 8th Field Depot will mark the wire "For training purposes only" and will re-issue it to the Garrison Force for such further use as is desired.
- 3. All commanders are requested to caution vehicle drivers, particularly LVT drivers, to exercise more care in avoiding overhead telephone wires and guy wires of telephone poles. Negligence in this respect should be treated as directed in Pare. 3 d (5) of Annex HOW to Corps Operation Plan Number 3-44, which is quoted below:

"Appropriate disciplinary action will be taken in all cases of careless destruction of telephone wire by vehicles."

- 4. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
- 5. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 6. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 4. Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45).
- 7. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 5, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45.)

014/150 Ser. 00156B

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order No. 14-45 (Continued).

8. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 6, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order No. 13-45).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W: W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Line Rouce Map.


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
Same as OpOrder No.	14-45 plus:		
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4th Mer Div	并	1stProvFAGroup	1
5th MarDiv	并	IsCom GarFor	1
VAC SigBn	ЪĻ	${\tt HqProvLVTGroup}$	1
LFSP Plt	1	CASCU Ashore	1
SigCo, SthFD	1	SigO, FMF Pac	2
DetMobileCommUnit		HqProvSigGrp	16
(Army)	2 `	FILE	10


OFFICIAL:

Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.


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






SEEET 3 OF 3 SHEETS





7 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER...15-45)

Mans:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued,

b. Naval Gunfire and Air Support as furnished by Joint Expeditionary Force Commander.

2. This Corps will continue the attack in echelon 8 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture the remainder of the island. King Hour 0750. 4thMarDiv attack at King Hour minus 90. 3dMarDiv and 5thMarDiv attack at King Hour.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, Objectives, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/23) on right (East) flank continue attack at King Hour minus 90, destroy enemy and capture remainder of the island within zone of action.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 2/26) on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action. Make main effort on right.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack. Fire not more than 400 rounds during the day in support of each division as requested.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- (1) BLT 2/26 in assembly area 199 DOG and 216 XRAY be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- (2) BLT 1/23 in assembly area 182 VICTOR WILLIAM be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. AA Arty furnish AA protection in Corps zone of action. Fire on outlying islands as ordered.
- g. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. See Corps General Order 1-45.
- x. (1) 4th and 5th MarDivs maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.

GFAD

(2) See paragraph 3x my Operation Order 3-44, except as herein modified.

- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply.
- 5. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE:

Operations Overlay.

BAKER:

Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 56 (1 CTG 53 (1 CTF 51 (1) }		L38th AA Arty Gp CG Garrison Forces Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1) (1) (1)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
.	<u> </u>		Each Special Staff Sec	(4)
CG 4thMarDiv (5	•	•		121
CG 5thMarDiv (5	<i>f</i>		(less overlay)	\ + {
CO Corps Arty(2	}	٠.	War Diary	(+)
CO BLT 1/23 (1)		Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 2/26 (1)	f	FILE	•

OFFICIAL:



7 March, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 15-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- l. Liaison officers will utilize telephone, teletypewriters, and telegraph channels for transmission of messages. They will cease use of radio circuit 5940 kc except when wire circuits are out.
 - 2. Make the following change in assignment of frequencies:
 "4th Division Recon Net from 4685 to 4845"
 - 3. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
 - 4. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 5. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 4, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45).
 - 6. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).
- 7. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 6, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:


- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Line Route Map.
- 3. Traffic Diagram.

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
Same as UpOrder No.	15-45 plus:		
3rd MarDiv	4	7th FC	10
4th MarDiv	4	138thAA Group	1
5th MarDiv	Ц.	1stProvFA Group	1
VAC SigBn	4	IsCom GarFor	1
LFSP Plt	1	HqProvLVT Group	1
SigCo, 8th FD	1	CASCU Ashore	l
DetMobileCommUnit (Army)	0	SigO, FMF Pac	2.
CTF 53	2	FILE	25
7,	,		


OFFICIAL:





V2 LIMES TO COLUMBUS








TEIE 4432 + 1 AV

Appendix 2 Annex Paker IanFor Operation Order Mo.15-45
Line Route Map IanFor
Effective 1200, 7 March, 1645
Scale 1-10,000
Special Air and Gunnery Target Map

74







8 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 16-45)

Consolidate positions at 1640. Attacks after that hour and prior to King Hour are authorized to seize limited objectives. Continue the attack tomorrow 9 March. King Hour 0700. Same boundaries and objectives as given in Corps Operation Order Number 15-45. LD (front lines at King Hour). Division Artillery will fire limited preparation fires to 1000 75mm and 1000 105mm for each division. Corps Artillery will furnish 300 rounds to each division for preparation, 200 rounds for all other fires including harassing fires. Naval gunfire availability, 1 CA and 4 DDs during the 24 hour period, ammunition allowance 200 AAC and 50 stars for each ship. At this rate 4 more days of naval gunfire are available. Corps Reserve no change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTF 51 CTF 53 CTF 56 CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CO 1st Prov Arty Gp

OFFICIAL:

9 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....17-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. (1) Air Support as furnished by VII Fighter Command.
- (2) Naval Gunfire Support as furnished by SOPA IWO JIMA. Naval Gunfire availability consists of 1 CA and 4 DDs during 24-hour period. Ammunition allowance provides 100 starshells and no limit on AA common for each ship.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0800 10 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture the remainder of the island.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 3/23) on right (East) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of the island within zone of action.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack at King Hour making main effort on right to destroy enemy within zone of action. Consolidate positions on left and secure control of remainder of island in left of zone of action. Maintain contact with 4thMarDiv.
 - c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 3/28) on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action. Make main effort on right. Maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
 - d. Corps Arty support the attack. Fire not more than 400 rounds for preparation fires for each of 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv and 200 rounds for 3dMarDiv as requested. After King Hour furnish supporting fires as requested.
 - e. Corps Reserve.
- (1) BLT 3/28 in assembly area 216 QUEEN be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Mor up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- (2) BLT 3/23 in assembly area 165 BAKER CHARLIE be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. More up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

f. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. Provide air defense as directed.

- x. See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.
- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply.
- 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.


ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay.
BAKER: Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTG 51.09 CTG 51.21 CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv	(1) (2) (5) (5)	CG Garrison Forces Shore Party Comdr VACLF Each Gen Staff Section Each Special Staff Sec (less overlay)	(5) (1) (1) (1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	War Diary	(1)
CO Corps Arty CO BLT 3/28	(2)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 3/23	(1)	FILE	

OFFICIAL:



014/150 Ser. 00173B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

SFAR

9 March, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. The following units of the Provisional Signal Group were released to the Commander Garrison Forces effective 0800, 7 March, 1945:

Det. Sig. Hq. Co., IsCom

Det. 568th SAW Battalion

Det. 49th Sig. Const. Bn.

Det. 726th AW Battalion

Det. #44, 70th AACS

Det. Comm Unit 434, (Grovac 11)

2. The directive for consolidation of communication facilities by the Garrison Forces promulgated in V Amohibious Corps Landing Force General Order Number 3-45 is quoted below for information:

"Garrison Forces will commence installation of the permanent island communication system insofar as the situation will permit, and so as not to interfere with the present Landing Force communication system. The Landing Force Signal Officer and the Garrison Force Signal Officer will coordinate installation of communication systems, with priority to the Landing Force until the assault phase is completed."

- 3. Garrison Signal Officers will coordinate their installation with div. signal officers before making signal installations which pass thru division zones of action.
- 4. The shackle code must be used for voice radio transmissions of target squares and time in tactical messages of less than URGENT precedence.
- 5. All major items of signal equipment except unserviceable equipment beyond 4th echelon repair (Field Depot maintenance) must be retained by Landing Force units and taken with them to rehabilitation areas upon conclusion of hostilities.
- 6. Make the following changes in established radio circuits as shown in Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45:
 - (a) Under JCC:
 Add Task Group Common 31.6 mc
 Delete Task Force Common 441 kc
 Change title of the circuit 2032 kc to read Local Task
 Force Common
 Add Local Ship Shore (CW) 355 kc (listen)
 Add Administrative Overload (Iwo Jima-Guam-Saipan) 3270 kc
 7825 kc
 12600 kc



Annex BAKER to Corns Operation Order Number 17-45 (Continued).

- 6. (Continued).
 - (b) Under Gropac 11: Add Landing Boat Common - 33.2 mc
 - (c) Under AACS:
 Add Universal-Combat-Air-Ground 6970 kc
- 7. Attention is invited to changes in this organization and special communication instructions contained in Com Group Two Top Secret Operation Order No. A-202-45 with ComPhibsPac letter serial 000149 appended.
 - 8. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).
 - 9. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 10. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 4, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45):
 - 11. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 3, this Annex).
- 12. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 6, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45).
 - 13. Task Group Call Signs (See Appendix 4, this Annex).

014/150 Ser. 00173B

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45 (Continued).

14. The Provisional Battalion, 4th Marine Division, has been assigned voice call WAGNER, cw call 7TA, name of switching central FREMONT.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Line Route Map.
- 3. Traffic Diagram.
- 4. Task Group Call Signs.


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
Same as OpOrder No.	17-45 plus:		
3rd MarDiv	3 .	1st Prov FA Group	1
4th MarDiv	3	IsCom GarFor	5
4th MarDiv	3	HqProv LVT Group	l
VAC SigBn	± 3	CASCU Ashore	1
SOPA	. 3	SigO, FMF Pac	2
7th FC	10	OO Sth FD	2
138th AA Group	1	FILE	25


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
E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

S-F-C-F











13.134





PANTAN DI AMOND COLUMBUS SHOPE Appendix 3 Annex Baker To LanFor Operation Order No. 17-45 Telephone Traffic Diagram LanFor Effective 1200, 9 March, 1945 OFROV. DUKW. GRP. WI CEED CALECT TUHLIAW TI GER SHURE STATE. Fig. O 2nd. ROMB DISPOSAL N MHITE EL MEN OWICKET - AWO TEMPLE GREEN/ TIGER HILMETE TOOK C DEIC:G FIRE-(COLUMBUS) CASF TR = FANTAN DIAMOND N COLUMBUS CASFER ัง

4

014/153 Ser. 00173B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

9 March, 1945.

Appendix 4 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45.

•	TASK GROUP CAL	L SIGNS		
		VOICE	<u>ew</u>	VIŞŲAL
1.09	Exmed Trps (Lt.Gen.SMITH)	MAINSPRING	4ZH	
	SOPA TWO JIMA (RearAdm HILL)	PICARDY	5UW	KlĠl
 · · ·		BANJO	50W1	K1G11
		PICARDY 2	5UW2	K1G12
		PICARDY 3	5UW3	KlG13
_,,		PICARDY 4	5UW4	KIG14
		PICARDY 5	5UW5	K1G15
		PIMENTO	5 V S	K1G2
	-	PLASMA	5WT	K1G3
_		FLASMA 1	5WT1	K1G31
-		PLASMA 2	5WT2	K1G32
		PRESSBOX	5ZJ	KlG4
		SIAPHAPPY	6ന്ന	K1G5
-		SLAPHAPPY 1	6UD1	K1G51
-	Fire Support Unit Two	SLAPHAPPY 2		K1G52
	Carrier Support & Ev Grp	SNUFFY		K1G6
		GAMECOCK 3		K1G61
		GAMECOCK 5	6 VL 2	K1G62
	Janfor Comdr (MaiGen SCHMIDT)	IGT00	41B	4IB
•		•		
71.20		STATLER	6zd	K1G8
בי לע ו		STATLER 1	6zD1	K1G81
		STATLER 2	6zd2	K1G82
		MISTRESS	5FI	4WE
		LONDON	4WE	
	1,21	Exped Trps (Lt.Gen.SMITH) 1.21 SOPA IWO JIMA (RearAdm HILL) 1.21.1 ASCU (Gomdr OSBORNE) 1.21.2 GroPac Unit 1.21.3 LST Unit 1.21.4 LSM Unit 1.21.5 LCT Unit 1.22 Garrison Group 1.23 Service Group 1.23 Service Group 1.23.1 Repair Unit 1.23.2 Salvage Unit 1.24 Screen 1.25 Gunfire Support Unit 1.25.1 Gunboat Support Unit 1.25.2 Fire Support Unit Two 1.26.2 Support Unit Two 1.26.1 Support Unit Two 1.26.2 Support Unit Two 1.26.2 Support Unit Two 1.26.3 Support Unit Two 1.26.4 Support Unit Two 1.26.5 Support Unit Two 1.26.6 Carrier Support & Ev Grp 1.26.1 Support Unit Two 1.26.2 Support Unit Two 1.26.3 Support Unit Two 1.26.4 Support Unit Two 1.26.5 Support Unit Two 1.26.6 Carrier Support & Net Laying 1.27 Convoy Group 1.28.1 Net Laying Unit 1.28.2 Minesweeping Unit 1.28.2 Convoy Group	Exped Trps (Lt.Gen.SMITH) 1.21 SOPA IWO JIMA (RearAdm HILL) 1.21.1 ASCU (Gomdr OSBORNE) 1.21.2 GroPac Unit 1.21.3 LST Unit 1.21.4 LSM Unit 1.21.5 LCT Unit 1.22 Garrison Group 1.23 Service Group 1.24 Screen 1.25.1 Repair Unit 1.26.2 Salvage Unit 1.27 Screen 1.28 Gunfire Support Unit 1.29 Carrier Support Unit 1.29 Carrier Support & Ev Grp 1.26 Carrier Support & Ev Grp 1.27 Support Unit Two 1.28 Support Unit Two 1.29 Support Unit Two 1.20 Support Unit Two 1.21 Support Unit Two 1.22 Support Unit Two 1.23 Support Unit Two 1.24 Support Unit Two 1.25 Carrier Support & Ev Grp 1.26 Support Unit Two 1.27 Lanfor Comdr (MajGen SCHMIDT) 1.28 Minesweeping & Net Laying 1.28.1 Net Laying Unit 1.28.2 Minesweeping Unit 1.29 Convoy Group MISTRESS	L.09 Exmed Trps (Lt.Gen.SMITH) MAINSPRING 4ZH 1.21 SOPA IWO JIMA (RearAdm HILL) PICAPDY 5UW 1.21.1 ASCU (Comdr OSBORNE) BANJO 5UW1 1.21.2 GroPac Unit PICARDY 2 5UW2 1.21.3 LST Unit PICARDY 3 5UW3 1.21.4 LSM Unit PICARDY 4 5UW4 1.21.5 LCT Unit PICARDY 5 5UW5 1.22 Garrison Group PIMENTO 5VS 1.23 Service Group PLASMA 5WT 1.23.1 Repair Unit FLASMA 1 5W11 1.23.2 Salvage Unit FLASMA 2 5W12 1.24 Screen PRESSBOX 5ZJ 1.25 Gunfire Support Unit SLAPHAPPY 6UD 1.25.2 Fire Support Unit SLAPHAPPY 6UD 1.25.2 Fire Support Unit Two SLAPHAPPY 2 6UD 1.25.2 Fire Support Unit Two GAMECOCK 3 6VL2 1.26 Carrier Support & Ev Grp SNUFFY 6VL 1.27 Lanfor Comdr (MajGen SCHMIDT) IGLOO 4IB 1.28.2 Minesweeping & Net Laying Group STATLER 6ZD 1.28.1 Net Laying Unit STATLER 1 6ZD1 1.28.2 Minesweeping Unit STATLER 2 6ZD2 1.29 Convoy Group MISTRESS 5FI

10 March 1945.

Change to

Change to OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 18-45)

- Modify paragraph 3.d. to read: "Corps Artillery support the attack of the 5thMarDiv. Division Artillery as designated in paragraphs 3.a. and 3.b. fire preparation fires from King minus 10 to King Hour on a general line from 235F Northwest 235G South center 235M center 235O Southeast. At King Hour fire will lift forward 100 yards and fire to King plus 10. At King plus 10 fire will lift forward 100 yards and fire to King plus 20".
- Modify paragraph 3.x. to read: "All troops East of Grid line 78.8 will be 200 yards South of the line 235F Northwest 235G South center 235M center 2350 Southeast prior to 0630 (King minus 2 Hours) All front line elements of the 5thMarDiv will be well dug in during air and artillery preparations prior to King Hour".

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dMarDiv

CG 4thMarDiv

CG 5thMarDiv

CO Corps Arty

OFFICIAL:

013/124 00194B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

11 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER ... 19-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. Naval Gunfire Support as furnished by SOPA IWO JIMA. Naval Gunfire availability consists of 1 CA, 4 DDs, and 2 LCS(L)s during 24-hour period. Ammunition allowance provides 100 starshells and no limit on AA common for each CA and DD.

2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0800 12 March to capture the remainder of the island.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- a. 5thMarDiv on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action. All artillery of the Corps available to 5thMarDiv for preparation and to support the attack.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack at King Hour on left, destroy enemy, capture remainder of island within zone of action. Commencing at King Hour thoroughly monup remainder of zone of action beginning at coastline and progressively working back through zone of action. Make available divisional artillery for preparation and to support the attack of 5thMarDiv.
- c. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/24) on right (East) flank commencing at King Hour eliminate pocket of resistance in Southwest corner TA 184 and mop up thoroughly zone of action beginning at coastline and progressively working back through zone of action. Make available divisional artillery to fire preparation and support the attack of 5thMarDiv.
- d. Corps Artillery fire preparation fires and support the attack of 5thMarDiv as requested. All Artillery of the Corps available to 5thMarDiv as requested.
- e. Corps Reserve, BLT 1/24, in assembly area 183 KING LOVE be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on a hour's notice. Mop up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.



f. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. Provide antiaircraft and air defense as directed.

x. See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.

4. Current Administrative Orders apply. 4thMarDiv continue preparations for reembarkation.

- a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE:

Operations Overlay.

BAKER: Signal Communications.


DISTRIBUTION:

	,		
CTG 51.09	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1)
CTG 51.21	(2)	Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	(less overlay)	(1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	War Diary	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(5)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 1/24	(1)	FILE	•
CG GarFor	(5)		•

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

lau



11 March, 1945.

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45:

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- 1. Cancel the instructions for Flash Alert contained in paragraph 2(a)(4) of Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 7-45 and in LanFor Confidential Dispatch 261610K, and substitute the following:
- (a). Effective immediately the ADCC (AGATE) will establish Air Raid Warning Conditions and AA Control Ashore. Air Raid Warning Conditions will be promulgated in the landing force in the following manner:

The ADCC will notify LanFor Message Center (TIGER 11) of Air Raid Conditions, Condition Red and Condition White will be disseminated to all units ashore by the LanFor Message Center using all available means of communication. The ADCC will broadcast Air Raid Conditions and Anti-Aircraft Control on the Local Air Warning Net:

- (b). Air warning alerts and control color messages will be authenticated with the shackle code authenticator.
- (c). Flash Red alerts for units ashore will be originated only by the ADCC.
- (d). When the ADCC calls the TIGER Message Center to pass flash warnings, it will use the phrase: "TIGER 11 PRIORITY" in obtaining the telephone connection.
- (e). The ADCC will keep Landing Force C-3 constantly advised of the status of "bogey" planes and action being taken during red and blue alerts by telephone over the direct telephone line to C-3.
- (f). The LanFor Message Center will sound the electric siren at Corps CP immediately on receiving flash alert messages from the ADCC.
- (g). Sounding of sirens within major landing force units after receipt of official flash alerts originating at the ADCC will be as directed by commanders of those units.
 - (h). Transmission of flash alerts will take the following form:
 - "This is AGATE (IGLOO, TIGER, etc) FLASH RED (WHITE, BLUE)
 Ashore information passed by AGATE (IGLOO, TIGER, etc)
 Control GREEN (YELLOW) + Authenticator"
 - 2. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).

Annex Baker to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45 (Continued).

- 3. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).
- 4. Toletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 3, this annex).
- 5. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 4, this Annex).
- 6. Garrison Radio Circuits. (See Appendix 5, this Annex).
- 7: Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 2, to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.


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
- 1. Circuit Diagram.
- 2. Line Route Map. (To be distributed separately).
- 3. Teletype Circuit Diagram.
- 4. Traffic Diagram.
- 5. Garrison Force Circuits.

DISTRIBUTION:


Same as OpOrder No.	19-45 plus:		-
3rdMarDiv	3	Gropac 11	1
4thMarDiv	3	1st Prov FA Group	1
5thMarDi ∀	3	IsCom GarFor	5
VAC SigBn	3	HgProv LVT Group	ĺ
SOP <u>A</u>	3	CASCU Ashore	1
7thFC	10	SigO, FMF Pac	2
138th Aa Group	1	CO gth FD	2
ADCC	5	FILE	125


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





1 Annex Baker To Lanfor Operation Order No. 1945









014/153 Ser. 00194B

V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

11 March, 1945

3465

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45.

Bl(g)(1) Local Warning

1. The following Garrison radio circuits have been established:

(a). JCC:

A2¢	Fifth Fleet TF	4205
EPS(p)	Island Command	422
EP8(c)	Island Command	1779
E33	Major Air Tactical	3710 7135 11130 13170
EPT3	Oper Pt-to-Pt	5370 8880 123 9 5
A8	Jump Fox	106 4125 6355 8250 9330 12375 16500
A31	Int'l Calling & Distress	500 _. 468
E116	Is Base Net	2630
E35	Is Base Air Tac	261 6 5320
B2	Local TF Com	2032
EPT4	Admin Overload (Iwo Jima - Guam Saipan)	3270 7825 12600

014/153 Ser. 00194B

1.

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45 (Continued).

(a).	JCC: (Cont	inued)	
÷	А5(ъ)	Local Ship-Shore	355
	E41	CENTPAC Isl Base (AirLiaison & Recon Air-Ground)	3755 7923 3313 7945
	ED121	Major Isl. Base	4335 7495 10867
	A23	Air Op Intell	4385 8770 13155
(b).	ADCC:		
		AAA Lia1son	41.2
	A26(A)	General Warning	3000
	Bl(p)	Inter-Fighter Direc	tor(P) 37.6 (S) 2096
	B1(g)(1)	Local Warning	3465
		Air Ground	126.18
	E45(a)	Army Homing	127.62
	B1(c)	SAD	140,58
	E43	CENPAC CAP	142.74
	B1(a)	Air-Sea Rescue	4475
		Isl Radar Report	82.0 85.0 90.0 81.0 80.0
	Bl(h)	Secondary ASP	3355
		Inter-Bn	2082

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45 (Continued).

1.	(c).	GROPAC 11:		*
		A5(c)	Harbor Circuit	2716
		A5(a)	Herbor Circuit	34.8
		Bl(g)(1)	Local Warning	3465
		B4(17)	Landing Boat Com	33.2
		B4(15)	Control Vessels	30.8
	(d)	70TH AACS:	(JACSPAC):	
		Bl(c)	SAD	140.58
		B4(29)	SAD (listen)	5135
		. •	Pt-to-Pt	3125 7545 7635
		EP6Y	Air-ground	4595
		ЕР 6Y	Control Tower Iwo Ji	ma6978
		EP6Y	Radio Range Iwo Jima (069°, 159°, 249°, 339° mag)	201
		ш р6 х	Homing Beacon	428

STATION	ı			RADIO	R	ANGE	1	HOMIN	3	1	CONTROL TOWN	ŒR.	I A	IRWAYS
RADIO CALL	1						1	BEACO:	<i>N</i>	f	(VOICE)		Á.	IR-GRD
NDC	1	CALL	1	FREQ	1	COURSES	1	CALL	FREQ	1	CALL 'X MXTS	1	REC 1 G	UARD
	1		1		ı		1	1		1	1	1	1	
EP6Y	1	OX	f	201	1	069	ŧ	OX '	428	1	MAPLE' 140.58	t	69701	4595
			t		t	159	1	1		f	1	1]	40581	
AMIL-OWI			t		t	249	f	f		1	•	1	1	
			•		ŧ	339	1	t		f	, t	1	1	•
			1		t	deg mag	ŧ	1		t	. F	1	1	

(e). VII FC:

EPS(g) Fighter Comd Net 91.2

C(6) LF Comd(when wire out) 29,2

Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 19-45 (Continued).

1. (e). VII FC: (Continued)

(0).	111 101 (0	On vindou,	
	EP8(a)	Island Command	38.4
	B1(g)(1)	Local Air Warning	3465
(f)	138th AA A	rty Group:	
ι		Command Net	1746
		Liaison Net	41.2
		LanForComd (Listens)	29.2
		Air Warning Intell Ashore	2490
		506th AAA Gun Bn	53 ₇ 10
		A & B Cos	5040
		C & D Cos	5260
		483rd AA Awpns Bn	4750

013/124 00184B V Amphibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.

10 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER. 18-45)

Maps:

Air and Gunnery Target Map of INO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. (1) Air Support as furnished. A bombing strike will reinforce the preparation fires. The strike is scheduled King minus 30 to King minus 10 from West to East on a line 250 SUGAR Northwest to 251 SUGAR Southeast.

(2). Naval Gunfire Support as furnished by SOPA IWO JIMA. Naval Gunfire availability consists of 1 CA, 4 DDs, and 1 LCS(L) during 24-hour period. Ammunition allowance provides 100 starshells and no limit on AA common for each CA and DD.

2. This Corps will continue the attack in echelon 11 March with 3 Divisions abreast to capture the remainder of the island. King Hour 0830. 3dMarDiv and 4thMarDiv attack at King Hour minus 60. 5thMarDiv attack at King Hour.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/24) on right (East) flank continue attack at King Hour minus 60, destroy enemy, capture remainder of the island and mop up within zone of action. Make available 3 Bns 105mm artillery for preparation and to support attack of 5thMarDiv.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center continue attack at King Hour minus 60, destroy enemy, capture remainder of island and mop up within zone of action. Maintain contact with 4thMarDiv and 5thMarDiv. Make available 2 Bns 105mm and 1 Bn 75mm artillery for preparation and to support attack of 5thMarDiv.
- c. 5thMarDiv (less BLT 3/26) on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy, and capture remainder of island within zone of action. Make main effort on right.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack of 5thMarDiv. Fire preparation fires from King minus 10 to King Hour on a general line from TA 235 KING Northwest to 235 OBOE Southeast followed by two 100 yard lifts for 10 minute periods lasting from King Hour to King plus 20. Divisional artillery designated fire preparation fires and support the attack as requested by the 5thMarDiv.



e. Corps Reserve.

(1) BLT 1/24 in assembly area 183 KING LOVE be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Mop up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

(2) BLT 3/26 in assembly area 199 DOG be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 1 hour's notice. Mop up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.

f. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. Provide antiaircraft and air defense as directed.

x. (1) All troops East of grid line 78.8 will be South of general line TA 235 KING Southwest to 235 TARE Southeast prior to 0630(King minus 2 hours). All front line elements of 5thMarDiv will be well dug in during air and artillery preparation concentrations prior to King Hour.

- (2) See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.
- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply, 4thMarDiv initiate steps preparatory to reembarkation.
 - 5. a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
 - b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE: Operations Overlay.
BAKER: Signal Communications.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTG 51.09 (1) CO Corps Arty (2) Each Gen Staff Sec (1)

CTG 51.21 (2) CO BLT 3/26 (1) Each Special Staff Sec (1)


CG 3dMarDiv (5) CO BLT 1/24 (1) (less overlay)


CG 4thMarDiv (5) CG GarFor (5) War Diary (1)

CG 5thMarDiv (5) Shore Party Comdr VACLF (1) Op Report (50)

F I J. E

OFFICIAL:





014/150 Ser. 00184B V Amohibious Corps Landing Force In the Field.




10 March, *1945

Annex RAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45.

- 1. Units of the Garrison Forces who were attached to the Provisional Signal Group during the assault are requested to forward a Signal Action report to V Amphibious Corns Signal Officer by 15 March, 1945. (See Provisional Signal Group Ser. 001000 with enclosures (A) to (0).)
- 2. Class 3 allowances afloat of cryptographic aids are now on hand in the Joint Communication Center.
- 3. Emergency supersession CSP 127\$\psi\$ series: XB-2 effective at 12\$\psi\$ GCT, 1\$\psi\$ March, 1945; DD-3 follows in normal order.
- 4. Radio will not be used when telephone, teletypewriter and telegraph channels are available. A radio-teletypewriter channel is available for transmissions to SOFA Iwo Jima and CG EXTROPAC.
- 5. Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 1, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45).
- 6. Line Route Map. (See Appendix 2, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45).
- 7. Teletype Circuit Diagram. (See Appendix 4, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 13-45).
- 8. Traffic Diagram. (See Appendix 3, Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 17-45).
 - 9. Garrison Radio Circuits. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).





Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45 (Continued).

10. Scheduled Messenger Service. (See Appendix 2, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

APPENDICES:

- 1. Garrison Radio Circuits.
- 2. Scheduled Messenger Service.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as OpOrde:	r No. 18-45 plus:		
3rdMarDiv	3	1st Prov FA Group	1
4thMarDiv	3	IsCom GarFor	5
5thMa r D iv	. 3	HgProv LVT Group	. 1
VAC SigBn	3	CASCU Ashore	· 1
SOPA	3	SigO, FMF Pac	2
7th FC	10	CO, 8th FD	2
138th AA G	roup 1	FILE	25

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC,

ACofS, C - 3.



10 March, 1945.

3465

Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Coros Operation Order Number 18-45.

Bl(e)(1) Local Warning

1. The following Garrison radio circuits have been established:

(a). JCC:

DI(E)(I)	Local Warning	3409
A2Ø	Fifth Fleet TF	4205
EPg(b)	Island Command	422
MP8(c)	Island Command	1770
E33	Major Air Tactical	1 3710 7135 11130 13170
EPT3	Oper Pt-to-Pt	5370 8880 123 95
A8	Jump Fox	106 4125 6355 8250 9330 12375 16500
A31	Int'l Calling & Distress	500 468
E116	Is Base Net	2630
E35	Is Base Air Tac	2616 5320
B2	Local TF Com	2032
EPT4	Admin Overload (Iwo Jima - Guam Saioan)	3270 7825 12600





Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45 (Continued).

1.	(a).	JCC:	(Continued)

	A5(b)	Local Ship-Shore	3 55
	E#1	CENTPAC Isl Base (AirLiaison & Recon Air-Ground)	3755 7920 3310 7945
	ED121	Major Isl. Base	4335 7495 10860
	A23	Air Op Intell	4385 8770 13155
(b).	ADCC:		,
	Bl(b)	Inter-Fighter Direct	or 37.6 2096
	\$ 1(g)(1)	Local Warning	3465
•			126.18
	E45(a)	Army Homing	127.62
	B1(c)	SAD	140.58 142.02
	E 43	CENPAC CAP'	142.74
	ep6y	Control Tower-Iwo Jima	6970
	B1(a)	Air Liaison Reserve	4475
	EP8(e)	Island Radar Report	85.0
,	EP8(f)	Island Radar Report	88.7

Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45. (Continued).

1.	(c).	GROPAC	11:

(e).

(0).			
	A5(c)	Harbor Circuit	2716
	A5(a)	Harbor Circuit	34.8
•	B1(g)(1)	Local Warning	3465
	c -6	LF Comd	29.2
	B4(17)	Landing Boat Com	33.2
(a).	70TH AACS:		
	Bl(c)	SAD 14	0.58
	B4(29)	SAD	513 5
		Pt-to-Pt	3125 7545 7635
	ep6Y	Air-ground	4595
	ep6y	Control Tower Iwo	6970
	ep6y	Radio Range Iwo Jima (069°, 159°, 249°, 339° mag)	201
	EP6Y	Homing Beacon	428
(e).	VII FC:		
	EP8(g) C(6)	Fighter Comd Net LF Comd(when wire	

out)

10 March, 1945.

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 18-45.

SCHEDULED MESSENGER SEPVICE

1. Officer Messenger Service and Guard Mail runs leave the LanFor Message Center for the following units ashore (via Jeep):

0800	1200	1600	1845	1900
0815 0840 0910 0940 1000	1215 1240 1310 1340 1400	1615 1640 1710 1740 1800	1900 1925 	1925 1950 2010 2020
1010	1410	1810	1940	2025
	0815 0840 0910 0940 1000 1010	0815 1215 0840 1240 0910 1310 0940 1340 1000 1400 1010 1410	0815 1215 1615 0840 1240 1640 0910 1310 1710 0940 1340 1740 1000 1400 1800 1010 1410 1810	0815 1215 1615 1900 0840 1240 1640 1925 0910 1310 1710 0940 1340 1740 1000 1400 1800 1010 1410 1810

2. Local runs to outside units (via runner):

Leave Message Center	0800	1200	1600	1900
Arrive Corps Arty	0805	1205	1605	1905
Arrive AA Arty	0810	1210	1610	1910
Arrive Message Center	0815	1215	1615	1915

3. Officer Messenger and Guard Mail service runs leave the LanFor Message Center for the following units afloat (via SigBn DUKW):

Leave Message Center	0700	0900	1300	1600
Arrive CTF 53	0730	0930 .	1330	1630
Leave CTF 53	0745	0945	1,345	1645
Arrive Message Center	0815	1015	1415	1715

- 4. Although the above schedules are primarily designated for delivery of dispatch traffic, other matter may be carried, provided no delay is involved.
- 5. The 1845 and 1900 runs may be utilized by the divisions for delivery of summaries to the Landing Force.
- 6. Hourly boat run from AUBURN to LST 784 (Green Beach):

Leave AUBURN each hour on the hour 0600 to 1800 Leave LST 784 each hour on the half hour 0630 to 1830



11 March 1945.

Change to OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 19-45)

Modify my Operation Order Number 19-45 as follows: King Hour is 0700, repeat 0700, instead of 0800.


BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG ExTro SOPA IWO CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CG GarFor CO Corps Arty CO BLT 1/24 Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:



12 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER....20-45)

Maps: Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

- 1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.
- b. Naval Gunfire Support as furnished by SOPA IWO JIMA. Naval Gunfire availability consists of 3 DDs and 2 LCS(L)s during 24-hour period. Ammunition allowance provides 100 starshells and no limit on AA common for each CA and DD.
- 2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0730 13 March to capture remainder of the island.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- a. 5thMarDiv on left (West) flank continue attack at King Hour, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action. All artillery of Corps available to 5th MarDiv for preparation fires and to support the attack.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) in center assist 5thMarDiv as it advances by mopping up resistance between cliffs running generally through TA 235 CBCE (SE) to 251 XRAY (N) and the sea. Enter 5thMarDiv zone of action as necessary to accomplish this mission. Thoroughly mop up assigned zone of action beginning at coastline and progressively working back to Airfield No. 2. Make available divisional artillery for preparation fires and to support attack of 5thMarDiv.
- c. 4thMarDiv (less BLT 1/24) on right (East) flank thoroughly mop up zone of action beginning at coastline and progressively working back through zone of action. Make available divisional artillery to fire preparation fires for, and to support attack of 5thMarDiv.
- d. Corps Artillery fire preparation fires for, and support attack of 5thMarDiv as requested.
- e. Corps Reserve, BLT 1/24, in assembly area 183 KING LOVE be prepared to move to attack in Corps zone of action on 2 hour's notice. Mop up in vicinity of assembly area. Maintain close liaison with Corps.
- f. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. Provide antiaircraft and air defense as directed.



x. See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.

- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply. 4thMarDiv continue preparations for reembarkation.
 - 5. 'CPs: See Operations Overlay.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.


ANNEX:


ABLE: Operations Overlay.

DISTRIBUTION:

CTG 51.09	(1)			Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1)
CTG 51.21	(S)		•	Each Gen Staff Section	
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)			Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)			(less overlay)	(1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)			War Diary	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)			Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 1/24	(1)	•		FILË	•
CG GarFor	(5)	•			

OFFICIAL:





13 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 21-45)

Continue the attack on 14 March in accordance with Corps Operation Order 20-45 as modified by my dispatch 130745K. King Hour is 0630. Limited objective attacks are authorized prior to King Hour.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG ExTro SOPA IWO CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CG GarFor CO 138th AAA Gp CO Corps Arty Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

14 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUIBER. 22-45)

Continue the attack 15 March in accordance Corps Operation Order 20-45 as modified by my dispatch 130745K and my 141620K. King Hour 0730. Limited objective attacks authorized prior to King Hour at discretion. 4thMarDiv continue reembarkation keeping VACLF advised of progress.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHILDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dlarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CO Corps Arty SOPA IWO Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

15 March 1945.

Changes to OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 23-45)

- 1. 5thMarDiv maintain contact with 3dMarDiv.
- Change paragraph 3.b. as follows: 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) on right (Northeast) flank execute relief on the line. Relieve elements of the 5thMarDiv in zone of action and assume responsibility therefor at King Hour minus sixty minutes. Attack at King Hour to destroy enemy and capture the remainder of the island within zone of action. Make the main effort in TA 251M. Continue to mop up the remainder of assigned zone of action.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv

OFFICIAL:

15 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER...23-45)

Maps: Air and Gunnery Target Map of IWO JIMA, 1:10,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Summaries as issued.

b. Navel Gunfire Support as furnished by SOPA IWO JIMA.

2. This Corps will continue the attack at King Hour 0815 16 March with two divisions abreast to capture the remainder of the island.

Zones of Action, Boundaries, LD (front lines at King Hour): See Operations Overlay.

- 3. a. 5thMarDiv on left (Southwest) flank continue attack at King Hour; destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action.
- b. 3dMarDiv (less RCT 3) on right (North) flank make passage of lines, relieve elements 5thMarDiv in zone of action, destroy enemy and capture remainder of island within zone of action. Make main effort in direction of TA 251 MIKE. Continue to mop up remainder assigned zone of action.
- c. 4thMarDiv on right (East) flank, commencing at King Hour, eliminate pocket of resistance in Southwest corner TA 184 and mop up zone of action.
- d. Corps Artillery support the attack giving preference of fires to 3dMarDiv.
- e. Corps Reserve, BLT 3/21, released to 3dMarDiv effective 2000 15 March.
- f. Garrison Forces ashore execute base development missions as ordered. Provide antiaircraft and air defense as directed.
 - x. (1) See paragraph 3x my Operation Plan 3-44.
- (2) 3dMarDiv and 5thMarDiv authorized to use each other division's zone of action for purpose of troop movement and supply of flank elements.
- 4. Current Administrative Orders apply. 4thMarDiv continue reembarkation, keep this Headquarters advised of progress.



5.

- a. CPs: See Operations Overlay.
- b. See Annex BAKER (Signal Communications).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

ANNEXES:

ABLE:

Operations Overlay.
Signal Communications.


DISTRIBUTION:


CTG 51.09	(1)	Shore Party Comdr VACLF	(1)
CTG 51.21	(2)	Each Gen Staff Section	(1)
CG 3dMarDiv	(5)	Each Special Staff Sec	
CG 4thMarDiv	(5)	(less overlay)	(1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(5)	War Diary	(1)
CO Corps Arty	(2)	Op Report	(50)
CO BLT 3/21	(1)	FILE	-
CG GarFor	(5)		

OFFICIAL:

E. A. CRAIG, Colonel, USMC, ACofS, C - 3.

S





Annex BAKER to Corbs Operation Order Number 23-45.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. (a) Lanfor cease operation on the following radio circuits:

Expeditionary Troops Command Expeditionary Troops Command	5605 OW 2956 Voice
Landing Force Command Landing Force Liaison	2404 CW 5940 Voice
Local Task Force Cmdrs Com	2032 CW
Shore Party Lat.	2276 Voice
Shore Party Lat. Shore Party Lat.	2154 Voice 2516 Voice
Task Group Cmdrs. Com	31.6 Voice
Logistical Control	2808 Voice
Logistical Control Logistical Control	2932 Voice 2304 Voice

- (b) Organizations desiring to activate any of the above circuits should notify this headquarters.
 - 2. (a) 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions may cease operation on:
 Support Air Request (SAR-1) 5465 Kcs.
 - (b) 4th Division will secure the following NGF frequencies:

3845	5380
5015	5645
4450	5540
4545	4 865
4770	4280

(c) 4th 155mm How Battalion will secure the following radio

nets:

3525 36.0 35.4 29.8 35.5 014/150 Ser. 00220B

Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order Number 23-45 (Continued).

J: Delete paragraph 1(c) Appendix 5 to Annex BAKER to Corps Operation Order No. 19-45; substitute new paragraph 1(c) as follows:

GROPAC 11:

A5(c)	Harbor Circuit	2716 also *B4(19)
A5(a)	Harbor Circuit	34.8 also *B4(4)
$B_1(g)(1)$	Local Warning	3465 also *B4(5)
*B4(17)	Landing Boat Com	33.2
*B4(9)	ĻST's	34.0

NOTE: *B4 Channels all column B.

4. Delete paragraph 3(b) (3), Annex HOW to Operation Order No. 3-44; substitute new paragraph: "See ALNAV 48 relative to forwarding casualty reports by radio."

5. Teletype Traffic Piagram. (See Appendix 1, this Annex).

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff.


APPENDIX:

1. Tel ctype Traffic Diagram.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as OpOrder No.	23-45 plus:		
3rd MarDiv	3	1st Prov FA Group	1
4th MarDiv	7 3	IsCom GarFor	5
5th MarDiv	3	HqProv LVT Group	1
VAC SigBn	3	CASCU Ashore	1
SOPA	3	SigO, FMF PAC	2
7th FC	10	CO, 8th FD	2
138th AA Group	1	FILE	25

OFFICIAL:



16 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 24-45)

Divisions will continue mopping up any remaining enemy in the assigned zones of action. 4thMarDiv will continue embarkation. 5thMarDiv will commence preparations for embarkation with priority to heavy equipment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CG ExTro SOPA IWO CG GarFor Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:



17 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 25-45)

20nes of action. 4thMarDiv continue embarkation. 5thMarDiv continue mopping up assigned zone of action and commence embarkation with priority to personnel and equipment not required in mopping up. Report progress 1200 and 1800 daily.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H, SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv CG ExTro SOPA IWO CG GarFor Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

18 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 26-45)

1. Continue to execute the missions assigned in Corps Operation Order 25-45.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

OG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv CG 5thMarDiv SOPA TWO CG Garfor

Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

STATE

19 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 27-45)

1. 3dMarDiv continue present assignment. Be prepared to effect debarkation of 147th Infantry Reignent. 4thMarDiv will complete reembarkation. 5thMarDiv continue present assignment and continue reembarkation to include one infantry regiment. 3dMarDiv and 5thMarDiv continue mopping up and patrolling assigned areas thoroughly.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHAIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dMarDiv CG 4thMarDiv

CG 5thMar Div

SOPA IWO

Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

20 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 28-45)

1. Continue to execute the missions assigned in Corps Operation Order 27-45.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

CG 3dlarDiv CG 5thMarDiv SOPA IWO CG GarFor Shore Party Comdr

OFFICIAL:

1.

21 March 1945

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET dispatch.

NUMBER. 29-45)

3dMarDiv less RCT 3 and units transferred to rehabilitation area with 147th Inf Regt attached continue mopping up and patrolling assigned area. Embark 3d Tk Bn less Co A for return to rehabilitation area. 5thMarDiv continue reduction of enemy pocket in TA 234 and TA 250. Continue mopping up and patrolling assigned area. Reembark equipment, supplies and personnel consistent with above missions Corps Troops continue reembarkation as ordered.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

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22 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 30-45)

1. 3dMarDiv, less RCT 3 and reembarked elements, with 147th Infantry Regiment attached continue mopping up and patrolling in assigned area. 5thMarDiv will continue reduction of the enemy pocket in TA 254 and TA 250. Continue mopping up and patrolling of assigned area and preparation for reembarkation. Corps Troops will continue reembarkation as ordered.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

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23 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. . 31-45)

1. 3dMarDiv, less RCT 3 and reembarked elements, with 147th Infantry Regiment attached, will continue mopping up and patrolling in assigned areas. 5th MarDiv continue the execution of missions assigned in Corps Operation Order 30-45. Continue reembarkation of equipment and personnel not required for assigned tactical missions.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHOOLT:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

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OFFICIAL:

24 March 1945.

OPERATION ORDER)

Brief of SECRET Dispatch.

NUMBER. 32-45)

The enemy pocket is eliminated. Mopping up continues. For 25 March 1945 continue the execution of missions assigned in Corps Operation Order 31-45. Make the necessary preparations for the execution of the provisions of Corps General Order 6-45 and my SECRET dispatch 240550Z. Corps Troops will reembark as ordered.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL H. SCHMIDE:

W. W. ROGERS, Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff.

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B. CONTROLLED DIFFERENTIAL:

l. An interesting fact to note is the complete lack of controlled differential trouble on this operation. In nineteen days operation on Saipan, this battalion encountered eight controlled differential failures. Undoubtedly, the force - feed lubrication system, as installed by the factory, was the biggest factor in eliminating this trouble. Cutting three turns from the transmission oil pressure control valve spring helped in combination with the fact that this was by far the coolest weather encountered during an operation.

C. FINAL DRIVES:

terior final drive failures during this operation, can be contributed to two things; structural weakness and overloading. The final drives were designed for use in the M-3 tank and are not heavy enough for the LVT. Twelve of the fifteen failures occurred in LVT(4)s which were in great demand all during the operation. These vehicles were utilized in carrying the heaviest and bulkiest loads because they are easier to load and unload than the LVT(2).

D. RAMP BUMPER:

l. The removal of four and one half inches from each end of the ramp bumper bar on the LVT(4)s served its purpose very well but as the sponsons were not reinforced or modified, they suffered considerable damage in loading and unloading from LSTs during rough weather.

E. AMPHIBIAN TRAILERS:

1. This battalion unloaded forty-seven amphibian tailers at the target area. These trailers weigh 4400 lbs emty and approximately 8800 lbs loaded. The exle is located two thirds of the way back on the chassis of the trailer thereby putting all the weight on the draw bar. It is impossible to get enough men around one to the trailers to raise the draw bar high enough so that it can be coupled to an LVT. The trailers

ENCLOSURE (B)

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on the main deck of the LST #761 were moved by placing a five ton floor jack under the draw bar and then pulling them with a winch cable and appropriatly placed snatch blocks.

2. It is extremely dangerous for a loaded LVT to tow a loaded amphibian trailer down the deck ramp of an LST, therefore empty LVTs were used. Each LVT that towed an amphibian trailer could have carried the load of two or more trailers. In view of the facts above it is recommended that the further use of amphibian trailers be discontinued.

F. MAINTENANCE LST

- The LST #761, in addition to being a battalion maintenance ship, carried a platoon of LVTs and a load of ammunition, water and rations. This arrangement is entirely unsatisfactory as the unloading of the preload interfered with the maintenance work and vice versa. Since the preloads also contained explosives, welding was prohibited until all of the preload was moved ashore. This further hampered necessary LVT repairs. The preloads, being placed on the side of the LST tank deck, necessitate the LVTs be parked so close together that it is impossible for the LVT crews to lubricate any of the important outside fittings, or tighten any loose track or sprocket bolts, hence the large number of sheared final drive studs encountered D-day (19Feb). It is a difficult task to snake a damaged LVT aboard an LST. Once the tank deck is full of damaged tractors it is impossible to unload any until those that are taken in last are repaired. Since an LSD is equipped with two powerful cranes and a stern ramp it is recommended that In future operations an LSD be furnished as an LVT maintenance ship.
- In the event that an LSD cannot be furnished it is recommended that an LST be furnished as an LVT maintenance ship. This LST should not have a preload. A Platoon of LVTs could be carried to the target area, on this ship, but should not return aboard after once debarking. This LST would then be left entirely clear for LVT maintenance. It should be stationed as close to the beach as possible, during the initial assault, so as to reduce the number of LVTs that sink while under tow to the LVT maintenance ship. This ship could be beached early in

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the operation and used as an LVT maintenance shop until time and space permitted the heavy maintenance unit to move ashore.

of their primary purpose, which is to act as a mother ship for a platoon of Amphibian Tractors. This battalion lost four cargo LVTs and one LVT retriever unit as a direct result of LSTs refusing to stop and pick them up. LST Captains should be reminded of their responsibility to the LVTs based aboard their ship.

M. E. LUNN

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ENCLOSURE (B)